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QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
1. Whether the court of appeals erred in approving an award of punitive damages
without any finding that compensatory liability was based on tort, without a prior finding
of punitive damage liability, and when compensatory liability had been tainted by
introduction of wealth evidence.
2. Whether the court of appeals erred in affirming an award of attorney fees for
all of plaintiffs' claims, even though the legal basis for the verdict cannot be determined,
most of the claims were unsuccessful, and the fee award is based only on defendant's
counterclaim.
COURT OF APPEALS OPINION
The court of appeals opinion is reported as Dejavue, Inc. v. U.S. Energy Corp.,
383 U.A.R. 9 (Utah App. 1999), as set forth in the Appendix. (App. 1.)
JURISDICTION
A. The court of appeals decision was entered December 2, 1999.
B. On January 3, 2000, this Court entered an order extending the time for filing
this petition to February 3, 2000.
C. This Court has jurisdiction of this petition pursuant to U.C.A. § 78-2-2(3)(a)
and (5).
CONTROLLING LEGAL PROVISIONS
Determination of the legal issues is governed in part by U.C.A. §§ 78-18-l(l)(a)
and (2) and 78-27-56.5, which are set forth verbatim in the Appendix. (App. 51-52.)
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This dispute arises out of plaintiffs' lease and operation of defendant's
recreational properties in southern Utah. Defendant suspended the lease after
discovering plaintiffs' misappropriation of funds. Plaintiffs thereafter sued defendant,
alleging various contract and tort claims. Defendant asserted contract and tort
counterclaims. At the close of trial, the jury rendered a general verdict, awarding

^-

plaintiff Dejavue compensatory damages in the amount of $90,871. The verdict did not

~

specify whether liability was based on contract or tort. Neither did the verdict contain
any question or finding of liability for punitive damages. Nevertheless, the court directed
the jury to retire a second time to consider an award of punitive damages. The jury
returned a punitive verdict of $62,500. The court subsequently awarded attorney fees of

<

$91,668, even though it admittedly could not determine whether the verdict was based on
contract or tort, and without reduction for unsuccessful claims. 383 U.A.R. at 9; (R. 1,
i

110, 1385-86, 1662-63).
The court of appeals affirmed. Regarding punitive damages, the court of appeals
upheld the award, even though it conceded that the tort or contract basis for liability

I

could not be determined. The court found no need for a prior finding of punitive damage
liability because defendant failed to object to the district court's procedure at trial. The

i

court upheld the award of attorney fees on the sole basis that plaintiffs prevailed on
defendant's contract counterclaim. However, the court upheld fees for all of plaintiffs'
i
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STATEMENT OF FACTS
The facts material to the legal issues presented aic not in dispute.
Defendant. U.S. Energy Corp., owns and operates a mobile home park,,
C

\.-r)>.

L

>•
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May - l)(H. I ! ,S. Lnergy leased the restaurant and lounge to plaintiff Dejavue, Inc., which
is ow ned and controlled by plaintiffs Allison Nord and Krislinc Schullz. Soon thereafter,
the parties agreed that plaintiffs would also manage 1:1K monik home park, store, and
motel 383 1 J < \ R ; H .9. , (R 558 91. 842 891-905)
Ii I Febn lai y 1996, , • dispi ites arose between the parties over management of tl ic
properties and accounting for various funds and revenues. The parties terminated their
business relationship,, and this action followed 383 U A R at 9; (R. 17u~h <
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conversion, misrepresentation, trespass, intentional infliciion -1 emotional distress, and
unjust enrichment (R 52,2.) I J.S. Energy asserted a counter^ taim. >:<-eginu, In- "acli ot
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tort and contract liability, and with no question regarding liability for punitive damages.
The jury returned a general verdict in favor of plaintiff Dejavue, assessing compensatory
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

damages in the amount of $90,871. (R. 1385); 383 U.A.R. at 9. There was no finding of
liability for punitive damages and no demonstration that compensatory liability was
based on tort rather than contract.
The trial should have ended right there, but it did not. The district court then
informed the jury that it could also award punitive damages. (Tr. 1323-1324.) The court *
gave three jury instructions on punitive damages, and then sent the jury out to consider

~

punitive damages, with a modified general verdict form that read only: "We, the jury . . . —
find the issues in favor of the plaintiff Dejavue and award punitive damages . . . against
the defendant in the sum of $

- *'•

." (R. 1386.) Again, there was no question

regarding any basis for punitive damage liability. Plaintiffs' counsel then referred the
jury to Exhibit 91, the annual report that showed U.S. Energy's financial status (which
had been improperly introduced during the compensatory phase of the trial), and
requested $300,000 in punitive damages. (Tr. 1325-28.) The jury returned a half-hour
later, having simply filled in the blank for punitive damages in the amount of $62,500.
The jury made no express finding that compensatory liability was based on tort, or that
defendant's conduct justified punitive damage liability. (R. 1386; Tr. 1331); 383 U.A.R.
at 9.
Plaintiffs filed a post-trial motion requesting nearly $107,000 in attorney fees,
including $67,000 for their lead counsel, Mr. Bugden. The alleged basis for attorney
fees was the lease contract, and plaintiffs claimed to have prevailed on their contract
claims. However, the fee request was not apportioned between contract and tort claims.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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(R. 1388, 1392, 1396.) U.S. Energy challenged the request on the grounds that, given
the general verdict, it was impossible to determine whether plaintiffs prevailed on their
contract claim, and most of plaintiffs9 claims were not based on contract. (R. 1464,
1505, 1559.) In a post-trial ruling, the district court awarded attorney fees, but only for
actual trial time of lead counsel Bugden on behalf of plaintiff Dejavue. (Tr. of 7/28/98 p.
4; R. 1524-25.) Despite these express limitations, the district court ultimately awarded
attorney fees in the amount of $91,669 (R. 1659-60), far more than Bugden's initial fee
request for all his work on all the claims on behalf of all the plaintiffs. The court
subsequently entered a final Amended Judgment. (R. 1662); 383 U.A.R. at 9.
The court of appeals affirmed, upholding the award of punitive damages even
though "the trial court had no way of knowing under which theory or theories of liability
the jury awarded its verdict." 383 U.A.R. at 12. The court held that no specific finding
of punitive damage liability was required because U.S. Energy failed to object to the
district court's procedure at trial. Id. at 10. The court ignored defendant's argument that
the procedure was illegal as a matter of law, under U.C.A. § 78-18-1(2). Regarding
attorney fees, the court held that Dejavue was entitled to fees on all its claims, even
though the exact basis for liability could not be determined, because Dejavue prevailed
on U.S. Energy's contract counterclaim. The court held that the attorney fees need not be
reduced for unsuccessful claims because plaintiffs legal theories were related. However,
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the court made no finding that plaintiffs legal theories were related to defendant's
contract counterclaim, which was the sole basis for any fees at all. Id. at 10-11}
ARGUMENT
This Court's review is necessary because this case presents important issues of
state law that either have not been, but should be decided by this Court, or that were

^i

decided contrary to prior decisions of this Court. Specifically, the punitive damages

-

issue contains elements of first impression, with statewide significance, that should be
decided by this Court. The court of appeals decision on both punitive damages and
attorney fees is in conflict with prior decisions of this Court.
POINT I:

A.

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN UPHOLDING
PUNITIVE DAMAGES WHEN THERE WAS NO FINDING
THAT COMPENSATORY LIABILITY WAS BASED ON
TORT, NO PRIOR FINDING OF PUNITIVE DAMAGE
LIABILITY, AND COMPENSATORY LIABILITY WAS
TAINTED BY INTRODUCTION OF WEALTH EVIDENCE.

Punitive Damages Can Be Awarded Only For Liability Based In Tort
The law in Utah is well settled that punitive damages cannot be recovered for

breach of contract, but only for liability grounded in tort. E.g., Cook Associates, Inc. v.

<

Warnick, 664 P.2d 1161, 1167 (Utah 1983). In a case alleging both contract and tort
theories, the verdict must clearly specify a tort basis for liability, otherwise a verdict for
punitive damages cannot be sustained. Id. at 1168. "If there is doubt whether the

1

Actually, the record is not all that clear as to the prevailing party on defendant's contract
counterclaim. One of the significant procedural irregularities at trial was the court's directing the jury to
execute the general verdict form finding for U.S. Energy on its counterclaim, but awarding zero damages.
The court later claimed error and accorded no significance to that verdict. (R. 1384; Tr. 1321-23, 133233.)
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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<

general verdict awarded damages for tort, the consequences of that doubt must be
charged to [the] plaintiff..., who had the burden of requesting special verdicts." Id.,
n.5. Moreover, a plaintiff alleging both contract and tort theories for the same loss
cannot properly recover on both theories, "since that would represent double recovery."
Id. at 1168. A verdict must resolve all issues between the parties, otherwise "it is fatally
defective and such defect is substantial and reversible error." Owens v. McBride, 694
P.2d 590, 594 (Utah 1984).
Here, plaintiffs asserted numerous alternative contract and tort claims, yet failed to
request a special verdict form that would have permitted the jury to designate the basis
for liability. By failing to request a special verdict, plaintiffs waived their right to a jury
determination of issues that could have been resolved by such a verdict. Rule 49, Utah
R. Civ. P.; Cook Associates, supra. Specifically, they waived a right to determination of
whether liability was based on contract or tort, and of whether defendant's conduct
manifested the requisite intent to justify punitive damages.
The general verdict in this case states only that the jury "find[s] in favor of the
plaintiff Dejavue, Inc. and against the defendant, and assess[es] the plaintiffs damages at
$90,871." (R. 1385.) The verdict does not specify whether liability is based on contract
or tort. The district court, in rejecting plaintiffs' claim to prejudgment interest, expressly
held that the basis for liability could not be determined:
[T]he Courtis of the opinion that the way the verdict was framed with the-the general verdict, that it did not break down as to what the damages were
for
This Court has no way of knowing what are special damages or
what may be general damages. [Tr. 7/28/98, p. 3, App. 27.]
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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The court of appeals agreed that the legal basis for the compensatory verdict cannot be
determined:
Because the general verdict form did not identify the specific claims on
which the award was based, we are unable to determine whether Dejavue
prevailed on its breach of contract claim

. . . In this case, the trial court had no way of knowing under which theory
or theories of liability the jury awarded its verdict. [383 U.A.R. at 11-12.]
The court of appeals decision upholding the award of punitive damages must be
reversed because it conflicts with this Court's decision in Cook Associates, Inc. v.
Warnick, supra. "The verdict for punitive damages cannot be sustained because the
record does not show an award of compensatory damages in tort to which such punitive
damages could be ascribed." Cook Associates, supra, at 1168. The consequences of
doubt regarding the basis for liability must be charged to plaintiffs, "who had the burden
of requesting special verdicts." Id. Because the general verdict fails to specify that
compensatory liability is based on tort, the verdict is "fatally defective" as a basis for
punitive damages, and the judgment based thereon must be reversed. Owens v. McBride,
supra, at 594.2

In requesting attorney fees, plaintiffs argued that compensatory liability was based on contract. (R.
1396.) This further precludes them from claiming, for purposes of punitive damages, that compensatory
liability was based on tort. Plaintiffs cannot fairly interpret the same general verdict as being based on
contract for purposes of attorney fees, but based on tort for purposes of punitive damages. The two
awards are inconsistent and mutually exclusive.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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B.

Punitive Damages Must Be Preceded By A Finding of Punitive Damage
Liability.
This Court has long approved a bifurcated procedure for punitive damages in

which the jury first determines punitive damage liability, i.e., whether the defendant's
conduct or mental state justifies punitive damages; and if so, the jury determines in a
second, separate phase the amount of punitive damages to award. The reason for making
the two determinations separately is to avoid tainting or skewing the liability question
with evidence of the defendant's wealth. See Crookston v. Fire Insurance Exchange,
817 P.2d 789, 807 n.23 (Utah 1991); Ong International v. 11th Avenue Corp., 850 P.2d
447,456 (Utah 1993); Annot., "Necessity of Determination or Showing of Liability for
Punitive Damages Before Discovery or Reception of Evidence of Defendant's Wealth,"
32A.L.R.4th432(1984).
This procedure is also required by the punitive damages statute, U.C.A. § 78-18-1:
( l ) ( a ) . . . punitive damages may be awarded only if compensatory or
general damages are awarded and it is established by clear and convincing
evidence that the acts or omissions of the tortfeasor are the result of willful
and malicious or intentionally fraudulent conduct, or conduct that manifests
a knowing and reckless indifference toward, and a disregard of, the rights
of others.

(2) Evidence of a party's wealth or financial condition shall be
admissible only after a finding of liability for punitive damages has been
made. [App. 51, emp. added.]
The procedure followed in this case deviated significantly from the proper
procedure outlined above. To begin with, as discussed below, plaintiffs improperly
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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introduced evidence of defendant's wealth during the compensatory damage phase of the
trial. At the conclusion of the compensatory phase, plaintiffs used a general verdict form
that failed to address in any way the punitive damage liability of U.S. Energy. No
question was asked whether plaintiffs had proven, by "clear and convincing evidence,"
that defendant's conduct was "willful and malicious." Consequently, the jury made no
finding of such liability.
The court of appeals erroneously reasoned that U.S. Energy had a duty to object to
the district court's procedure and jury instructions, 383 U.A.R. at 10, suggesting at oral
argument that defendant had the burden to request a special verdict form to establish the
absence of punitive damage liability. However, as set forth above, the burden was on
plaintiffs to request a special verdict form in order to establish the existence of punitive
damage liability. Cook Associates, Inc. v. Warnick, supra, 664 P.2d at 1167-68; Rule 49,
Utah R. Civ. P. Absent that requisite prior finding, plaintiffs had no right to have the
jury consider an award of punitive damages at all. U.S. Energy does not dispute the jury
instructions, but rather the authority of the district court to proceed to a punitive damages
phase at all when plaintiffs had waived the necessary finding of punitive damage
liability, and the jury had consequently made no such finding.
The district court's act of informing the jury that punitive damages could be
awarded, and then sending the jury out with a single-sentence verdict form that asked
only how much to award necessarily prejudiced the verdict. Any reasonable juror is
going to do just as asked and simply fill in the blank with an amount. Again, the court of
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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appeals faulted U.S. Energy for not requesting a liability question on the second verdict
form, but by then consideration of punitive damages was barred by plaintiffs' own
failure to request a finding of punitive liability on the first verdict form. Under the case
law and statute set forth above, it was prejudicial error for the jury to consider both
punitive liability and amount of punitive damages at the same time. By failing to request
a determination of punitive liability in the first phase of the trial, plaintiffs were
precluded from seeking that determination in a second phase, and defendant's failure to
challenge the second phase was rendered moot.
In any event, as the court of appeals found support for its conclusion in cases
involving jury instructions, 383 U.A.R. at 10, this Court, "in its discretion and in the
interests of justice, may review" the matter, even in the absence of a trial objection. See
Rule 51, Utah R. Civ. P. See also State v. Beltran-Felix, 922 P.2d 30, 37 (Utah App.
1996) (appellate court may address manifest violation of statute not raised below);
Yannuzzi v. United States Casualty Co., 115 A.2d 557, 563 (N.J. 1955) (appellate court
may justly enforce statutory protection not raised below); MeGarry Bros. v. City of St.
Thomas, 66 N.W.2d 704, 708 (N.D. 1954) (appellate court will review plain error even
where statutory protection was not raised below).
Accordingly, the decision of the court of appeals conflicts with this Court's
decisions in Crookston v. Fire Insurance Exchange and Cook Associates, Inc. v.
Warnick supra, as well as with the punitive damages statute, 78-18-1(1) and (2). The
issue of the proper bifiircation procedure may also need to be clarified by this Court as an
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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issue of first impression under the punitive damages statute. See C.T. v. Johnson, 977
P.2d 479, 486-88 (Utah 1999) (Zimmerman, J., dissenting); Johnson, "Crookston v. Fire
Insurance Exchange and the Utah Punitive Damage Act: Toward a Sounder Law of
Punitive Damages" 1993 Utah L. Rev. 513, 540-44. Either way, this Court should grant
review to correct both the legal error and the injustice of paying punitive damages
without any prior finding of punitive damage liability.
C.

Compensatory Liability Was Tainted by Introduction of Wealth Evidence.

r-

As set forth in section 78-18-1(2), quoted above, "[e]vidence of a party's wealth u,
or financial condition shall be admissible only after a finding of liability for punitive
damages has been made." The statute is phrased in mandatory terms, establishing an
absolute prohibition on evidence of a defendant's wealth until after punitive damage
liability is established by clear and convincing evidence. Plaintiffs and the district court
violated this statute by introducing and admitting evidence of U.S. Energy's financial
condition during the compensatory damage phase of the trial. (Exh. 91, App. 38.)
The court of appeals excused this error on the basis of defendant's failure to
object at trial, asserting that the issue was first raised on appeal 383 U.A.R. at 10.
However, no objection is required to an act that is absolutely prohibited by statute. The
statute allows no exceptions, such as failure to object; by its terms, the prohibition is
absolute in every case. In any event, as set forth in Rule 103(d), Utah R. Evid., this
Court is not precluded from "taking notice of plain errors affecting substantial rights
although they were not brought to the attention of the [trial] court." Admission of illegal
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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evidence is "plain error" that must be corrected to preserve the intended statutory
protection, even when not raised at trial. See, e.g., State v. Beltran-Felix, supra, 922
P.2d at 37; Yannuzzi v. United States Casualty Co., supra, 115 A.2d at 563. Moreover,
U.S. Energy did raise the issue in its motion for new trial (R. 1541-46), giving the district
court an opportunity to correct the error. Therefore, the issue was not raised for the first
time on appeal.
As set forth in section 78-18-1(2), U.S. Energy has a statutory right to have its
compensatory liability determined without prejudicial and illegal evidence of its financial
condition. The issue of whether that right can be waived by inadvertent failure to object,
even though the violation is later brought to the attention of the trial court, is one of first
impression that this Court should resolve.
POINT II:

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AWARDING
ATTORNEY FEES FOR ALL OF PLAINTIFFS' CLAIMS,
WHEN MOST OF THOSE CLAIMS WERE
UNSUCCESSFUL AND UNRELATED TO DEFENDANT'S
CONTRACT COUNTERCLAIM, WHICH WAS THE ONLY
BASIS FOR FEES.

Attorney fees may be awarded only if authorized by contract or statute. If based
on contract, fees can be awarded only in accordance with the terms of the contract. Dixie
State Bank v. Bracken, 764 P.2d 985, 988 (Utah 1988). A party requesting attorney fees
in cases involving multiple contract and non-contract claims must "distinguish between
work done that was subject to a fee award and work that was not." Cottonwood Mall Co.
v. Sine, 830 P.2d 266, 269 (Utah 1992). Specifically, such a claimant must identify time
and fees for successful claims for which fees may be awarded, unsuccessful claims for
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

which fees could have been recovered if successful, and claims for which fees are not
recoverable. Id. at 269-70. Trial courts are expected to apportion fees among multiple
parties and separate legal claims in order to separate the recoverable fees from the
unrecoverable. Dixie State Bank v. Bracken, supra, at 990. See also Miller v. Martineau
& Co., 372 U.A.R. 34, 38-39 (Utah App. 1999); Schafir v. Harrigan, 879 P.2d 1384,

-

1393-94 (Utah App. 1994) (denying fees because most related to noncontract claims).

&

In this case, plaintiffs claim a right to attorney fees under section 19.02 of the
Sublease Agreement, which entitles U.S. Energy to attorney fees expended in recovering
possession of the premises. (App. 48-49.) However, by the time this action was
commenced, plaintiffs had already vacated the premises and defendant was in possession.
Accordingly, U.S. Energy's contract counterclaim does not seek possession of the
premises, but damages for breach of the contract. (R. 871.) Therefore, under the strict
terms of the contract, neither party was entitled to attorney fees. The court of appeals
decision thus conflicts with this Court's prior decisions, cited above, which limit the
recovery of fees under a contract to the precise terms of the contract. See also Loosle v.
First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass 'n, 858 P.2d 999, 1003 (Utah 1993) (denying fees for quiet
title action where note and trust deed provided for fees only in connection with
foreclosure).
Even assuming the lease agreement allowed fees for U.S. Energy's breach of
contract counterclaim, the reciprocity statute, U.C.A. § 78-27-56.5, would allow
plaintiffs to recover only its fees incurred in defense of that counterclaim. See
Occidental/Nebraska Fed. Sav. v. Mehr, 791 P.2d 217, 221 (Utah App. 1990) (allowing
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

fees "attributable to those claims on which the party was successful"), cited by the court
of appeals. 383 U.A.R. at 11. Neither the statute nor this Court's case law authorizes
recovery of fees for plaintiffs' own contract claim or for their multiple tort claims,
especially when, as shown above, it is impossible to determine from the general verdict
which claim provided the basis for liability. Plaintiffs' attorney fee affidavit fails to
apportion fees between successful and unsuccessful claims, and between recoverable and
nonrecoverable fees, as required by Cottonwood Mall and Dixie State Bank, supra.
The court of appeals cites only one Utah case in support of its decision, Sprouse v.
Jager, 806 P.2d 219 (Utah App. 1991). However, that case is easily distinguishable on
the grounds that the plaintiff was successful on its own contract claims, and its other
claims were "intertwined" with its own successful contract claims. The federal cases
cited by the court of appeals are similarly distinguishable. Here, by contrast, plaintiffs
have not prevailed on their own contract claims. The court of appeals expressly found
that "we are unable to determine whether Dejavue prevailed on its breach of contract
claim." 383 U.A.R. at 11. The only basis for recovery of fees is plaintiffs' success on
U.S. Energy's counterclaim. Id. Accordingly, it is immaterial that plaintiffs' own tort
claims are related to its own contract claims. The issue, rather, is whether any of
plaintiffs claims are related to defense of U.S. Energy's counterclaim. Plaintiffs have not
argued, and the court of appeals did not find, any such connection.
Therefore, plaintiffs are not entitled to recover any fees other than those incurred
in defending U.S. Energy's counterclaim. The court of appeals decision awarding
plaintiffs all of their
feesbyfor
all ofW.their
onJ.behalf
of Law
all School,
plaintiffs
Digitized
the Howard
Hunterclaims
Law Library,
Reuben Clark
BYU. is clearly
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contrary to this Court's decisions in Dixie State Bank v. Bracken and Cottonwood Mall
Co. v. Sine, supra. Accordingly, this Court should grant review to correct this legal error
and injustice.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, this Court should grant the petition for writ of certiorari.
The court of appeals decision on both punitive damages and attorney fees is contrary to
prior decisions of this Court. Moreover, the issues raised, some of first impression, are
of statewide significance and likely to reoccur unless settled and clarified here. This case
provides the Court a favorable opportunity to declare the law on these important issues.
Respectfully submitted this 3
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to a second degree felony for intentional or knowing conduct.
See Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-109(2) (1999).
6. Because we conclude the statute's language is not
ambiguous, we need not consider the Legislature's intent in
passing section 76-5-109. See Wilson, 969 P.2d at 418.
7. We note that our reading of "endangermcnt" is in line with
other jurisdictions' interpretations of statutes using the term.
See. e.g., State v. Deskins, 731 P.2d 104, 105-06 (Ariz. Ct.
App. 1986); People v. Odom, 226 Cal. App. 3d 1028,
1032-33 (Cal.Ct.App. 1991).
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This opinion is subject to revision before final
publication in the Pacific Reporter.
WILKINS, Presiding Judge:
1jl Defendant, U.S. Energy Corp., appeals a jury
verdict awarding plaintilT, Dejavue, Inc., S90,S71 in
compensatory' damages, $62,500 in punitive
damages, and $91,668 in attorney fees. On appeal,
U.S. Energy claims the trial court abused its
discretion in refusing to either grant a judgment
notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV) or order a newtrial. U.S. Energy also attacks the trial court's award
of attorney fees. Dejavue cross-appeals, claiming the
trial court erred as a mater of law in refusing to
award it prejudgment interest on the jury award. In
addition, Dejavue requests attorney fees on appeal.
We affirm and remand.
BACKGROUND
€
\2 U.S. Energy owns and operates a mobile home
park, convenience store, motel, restaurant and lounge
in Ticaboo, Utah, approximately ten miles from Lake
Powell. In May 1995, U.S. Energy subleased the
restaurant and lounge facilities to Dejavue, Inc.
(Dejavue), a corporation with two shareholders.
Allison Nord and Kristine Schultz. Shortly thereafter,
the parties agreed that Dejavue would also oversee
the mobile home park, convenience store, and motel,
for which Dejavue was to receive a $4,000 monthly

management fee.
V In February 1996, problems arose between the
parties, ultimately resulting in the termination of
Dejavue's lease and the removal of Nord and Schultz
as managers of the mobile home park, convenience
store, and motel. Thereafter, Dejavue, Nord, and
Schultz brought suit against U.S. Energy alleging
various contract and tort claims. U.S. Energy
counterclaimed for breach of contract. Before trial,
Schultz abandoned her claims and therefore they
were not presented to the jury.
*4 The case was tried in June 1998. At trial, Nord
asserted a cause of action for intentional infliction of
emotional distress and Dejavue asserted claims for
breach of contract, forcible entry, unlawful detainer,
conversion, misrepresentation, and unjust
enrichment. U.S. Energy asserted a counterclaim for
breach of contract, misrepresentation, contractual
I indemnification, and accounting. In order to impeach
! one of U.S. Energy's witnesses, Dejavue offered into
evidence U.S. Energy's 1997 Annual Report (the
report) "to demonstrate that U.S. Energy conducted
its business practices in a deceptive fashion." The
trial court admitted die report into evidence without
objection from U.S. Energy.
^5 At the close of trial, the case was submitted to
the jury on general verdict forms, witfi a separate
general verdict form for Nord, Dejavue, and U.S.
Energy on its counterclaim. The jury returned one
signed verdict form, awarding Dejavue $90,871 in
compensatory damages. Because the jury left the
general verdict forms for Nord and U.S. Energy
blank, the trial court instructed the jury foreman to
enter zero as the amount of damages and sign both
forms. After the jury returned its compensatory
award in favor of Dejavue, the jury deliberated again
and awarded Dejavue $62,500 in punitive damages.
In post-trial proceedings, the trial court refused to
award Dejavue prejudgment interest on its
compensatory damage award, but concluded Dejavue
was the prevailing party and entitled to attorney fees
under the sublease agreement.
€
,6 In August 1998, U.S. Energy filed a motion for
JNOV, or, in the alternative, for a new trial. U.S.
Energy argued the trial court erred in admitting U.S.
Energy's 1997 Annual Report and that the evidence
was insufficient to support a punitive damage award.
The trial court denied U.S. Energy's motion, hi
October 1998, the trial court entered findings of fact,
conclusions of law, and an order awarding Dejavue
$90,871 in compensatory damages, $62,500 in
punitive damages, and $91,668 in attorney fees. This
appeal followed.
ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
^j7 We address three issues on appeal. First, we
consider whether the trial court abused its discretion
in denying U.S. Energy's motion for JNOV or,
alternatively, for a new trial. When a party
challenges the sufficiency of evidence underlying a
trial court's denial of a motion for JNOV or a newtrial, "we reverse only if, viewing the evidence in the
light most favorable to die prevailing party, the
evidence is insufficient to support die verdict.1*
Crookston v. Fire Ins. Ere//., 817 P.2d 789, 799
(Utah 1991). Furthermore, "the appealing party 'must
marshal die evidence in support of the verdict and
then demonstrate that die evidence is insufficient
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when viewed in the light most favorable to the sufficiency of the evidence, it "must marshal all
verdict.1" Ifeslop v. Bank of Utah, 839 P.2d 828,839 evidence supporting the verdict" and then show that
(Utah 1992) (quoting Crookston, 817 P.2d at 799). the evidence cannot support the verdict. Von Hake v.
*!8 Second, we address whether the trial court nomas. 705 P.2d 766, 769 (Utah 1985). "The
correctly awarded attorney fees to Dejavue as the burden on an appellant to establish that the evidence
prevailing party. Whether attorney fees are does not support the jury's verdict... is quite heavy."
recoverable is a question of law which we review for Cambelt Int'l Corp. v. Dalton, 745 P.2d 1239, 1242
correctness. See Valcarce v. Fitzgerald, 961 P.2d (Utah 1987).
305, 315 (Utah 1998). However, the trial court has ^13
In this case, U.S. Energy has failed to meet
"broad discretion in determining what constitutes a this.burden. U.S. Energy has not marshaled the
reasonable fee, and we will consider^ that evidence upon which the jury could have based a
determination against an abuse-of-discretion finding of willful and malicious conduct, nor has it
standard." Dixie Slate Bank v. Bracken, 764 P.2d argued that this evidence was insufficient to support
985, 991 (Utah 1988).
the jury's punitive damage award. U.S. Energy
^9 Finally, we address whether the trial court erred ignores evidence that it forcibly removed Dejavue
in denying Dejavue's request for prejudgment interest from the leased premises, as well as evidence that it
on its compensator}' damage award. We review the failed to negotiate the motel management agreement
award of prejudgment interest, a question of law, in good faith. Finally, U.S. Energy overlooks
under a correction of error standard. See Andreason evidence that it converted Dejavue's restaurant
v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 848 P.2d 171, 177 (Utah equipment and used it for two years without
Dejavue's consent.
Ct. App. 1993).
€
Instead, U.S. Energy merely states those facts
ANALYSIS
914
most favorable to its position and ignores the
I. REFUSAL TO GRANT JNOV OR ORDER
contrary evidence. This is not adequate. See Promax
NEW TRIAL
^10
U.S. Energy claims two points of error in the Dev. Corp. v. Mattson, 943 P.2d 247,255 (Utah Ct.
trial court's refusal to set aside the jury's verdict and App. 1997). We have shown no reluctance to affirm
either grant a JNOV or order a new trial. First, U.S. the jury's verdict when a party fails to meet its
Energy contends that the trial court improperly marshaling burden. See, e.g., Wright v. Westside
admitted evidence concerning itsfinancialcondition S'ursery, 787 P.2d 508, 514 (Utah Ct. App. 1990).
during the compensatory damages phase of the trial. Accordingly, we assume the record supports the jury's
Second, U.S. Energy argues the jury failed to make verdict and refuse to consider U.S. Energy's claim of
the requisite finding of willful and malicious conduct insufficient evidence.
necessary to support an award of punitive damages.
C. Finding of Willful and Malicious Conduct
We address each point in turn.
* 15
U.S. Energy also challenges what it considers
A. Evidence of U.S. Energy's Financial
to be the trial court's failure to require a specific
Condition
finding of willful and malicious conduct on its part
«jl 1 Section 78-18-1 of the Utah Code provides by die jury prior, to consideration of the amount of
that evidence of a party's wealth or financial punitive damages to be awarded. However, U.S.
condition is inadmissible until a finding of liability Energy concedes that it failed to object to the
for punitive damages has been made. See Utah Code procedure followed by the trial court in this regard,
Ann. § 78-18-1(2) (1996). This rule is intended to or to object to the jury instructions given by which
prevent juries from being improperly influenced by the jury learned of its responsibilities in considering
a parly's wealth in assessing compensatory the requested award of punitive damages.
damages-damages which should be based solely on r 16
Having failed to object at trial, U.S. Energy
losses, not the losinu party's ability to paw See Ong may not now complain. See lanDyke v. Mountain
Int'l (U.S.A.) Inc. v.llthAve Corp., 850 P.2d 447, Coin Mack Distribs., Inc., 758 P.2d 962, 964 (Utah
456 (Utah 1993). In this case, Dejavue introduced Ct. App. 1988) ("If a party fails to object to a jury
U.S. Energy's 1997 Annual Report during the instruction, the objection is deemed waived on
compensatory damage phase of the trial, before a appeal."). As U.S. Energy also conceded at oral
finding of liability for punitive damages had been argument, the jury instructions given on this issue
made. Although the report was offered for were sufficient to instruct the jury on the law. We
impeachment purposes, it contained financial assume thejurv followed those instructions. See State
information regarding U.S. Energy's assets and net v. Burk, 839 P.2d 880,883 (Utah Ct. App. 1992) ("hi
worth. However, U.S. Energy did not object to the the absence of the appearance of something
admission of the report. It is well settled that issues persuasive to the contrary, we assume that the jurors
not raised before the trial court are waived on appeal. were conscientious in performing to their duty, and
See State v. Schreuder, 726 P.2d 1215, 1222 (Utah that they followed the instructions of the court."
1986) (stating in order "[t]o preserve a contention of (citations omitted)). Accordingly, wefindno error in
error in the admission of evidence for appeal, a the absence of a specific, pre- damagesfindingby the
defendant must raise a timely objection in the trial jurv of willful and malicious conduct on thepart of
court"). Because U.S. Energy failed to preserve the U.S. Enersv.
issue of admission of the report by raising a timely
II. ATTORNEY FEES
objection, we decline to further address this *I7
U.S. Energy also challenges the trial court's
argument.
award of attorney fees to Dejavue as the prevailing
B. Sufficiency or the Evidence
party. Specifically, U.S. Energy argues; (1) the
112
Because U.S. Energy's challenge to the jury's sublease agreement does not provide a basis for
punitive damages award amounts to an attack on the awarding Dejavue attorney fees; (2) Dejavue cannot
UTAH ADVANCE REPORTS
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In the present case, Dejavue successfully
establish that it prevailed on a breach of contract ^21
claim; and (3) in any event, the fees are excessive. defended against U.S. Energy's breach of contract
We disagree.
counterclaim. Accordingly, Dejavue is entitled to
A. Sublease Agreement
attorney fees under the sublease agreement.
^ 18
The sublease agreement between the parties Furthermore, Dejavue's contract and tort claims were
specifically provides that in the event of default by based on related legal theories involving a common
Dcjavue, U.S. Energy shall have the right to recover core of facts. The trial court specifically found that
reasonable attorney fees and costs. Utah law provides
the claims advanced by Dejavue, and
for the reciprocal right to recover attorney i^cst and
interposed as defenses to the counterclaims,
permits a court to award attorney fees to either party
were based on inter-related legal theories
prevailing in an action based on a written contract,
and arose from a common core of facts....
when the contract permits at least one party to
• Each of Dejavue's claims submitted to the
recover such kcs. See Utah Code Aim. § 78-27-56.5
jury was intertwined with its defense of the
(1996). However, "attorney fees authorized by
breach of contract . . . counterclaims and
contract are awardable only in accordance with the
arose from a common core of facts.
explicit terms of the contract." Maynard v. IWiarton,
912 P.2d 446, 451 (Utah Ct. App. 1996). Thus, U.S. Energy does not dispute these factual findings
under the terms of the sublease agreement and and therefore, we accept them as true. See C & Y
pursuant to Utah law, Dejavue is clearly entitled to Corp. v. General Biometrics, Inc., 896 P.2d47, 52
an award of attorney fees if it indeed prevailed on (Utah Ct. App. 1995) ("Because appellants do not
either its own breach of contract claim, or in challenge the trial court's factual findings, we must
defending against U.S. Energy's breach of contract accept thisfindingas true."). Accordingly, we affirm
counterclaim.
the trial court's conclusion that Dejavue is the
B. Breach of Contract Claims
prevailing party in this case and entitled to "attorney
^ 19
The jury returned a general verdict awarding fees incurred in presenting all of its legal theories."
Dejavue $90,871 in compensatory damages. Because
C. Reasonableness of Attorney Fees
the general verdict form did not identify the specific ^[22
We now consider whether the fees awarded
claims on which the award was based, we are unable to Dejavue were reasonable. Calculation of
to determine whether Dejavue prevailed on its breach reasonable attorney fees is within the sound
of contract claim. However, with respect to U.S. discretion of the trial court, so long as the fees are
Energy's counterclaim for breach of contract, the jury supported bv the evidence in the record. See Baldwin
returned a "no cause of action" verdict in Dejavue's v.£w/?o//,850P.2dll88,1199 (Utah 1993). Among
favor. Thus, although it is uncertain whether Dejavue the factors to be considered by the trial court in
prevailed on its breach of contract claim, Dejavue considering the reasonableness of the fee are "the
was clearly successful in defending against U.S. extent of services rendered, the difficulty of the
Energy's breach of contract counterclaim.
issues involved, the reasonableness of time spent on
•[20
Where a contract provides the "right to the case, fees charged in the locality for similar
attorney fees, Utah courts have allowed the party services, and the necessity of bringing an action to
who successfully prosecuted or defended against a vindicate rights." Id. at 1200. The trial court
claim to recover the fees attributable to those claims considered these factors, prepared written findings
on which the party was successful." supporting its action, and ultimately awarded
Occidental/Nebraska Feci Saw v. Mehr, 791 P.2d Dejavue slightly less than three quarters of die fees
217, 221 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). Furthermore, when it sought.
a plaintiff brings multiple claims involving a *[23
In this case, the trial court's determination
common core of facts and related legal theories, and that die attorney fees awarded were reasonable is
prevails on at least some of its claims, it is entitled to amply supported by the evidence. Dejavue submitted
compensation for all attorney fees reasonably attorney fee affidavits that included detailed billing
incurred in the litigation. See Henslev v. Eckerhart, statements. Additionally, Dejavue submitted the
461 U.S. 424, 435~ 103 S. Ct. 1933, 1940 (1983). expert affidavits of three local attorneys specializing
"However, a plaintiff must, at a minimum, be a in civil litigation who attested to the reasonableness
prevailing party with respect to a portion of the and necessity of Dejavue's fee request. U.S. Energy,
litigation in order to receive fees." Stewart v. in turn, failed to offer any evidence to refute the
Donges, 979 F.2d 179, 183 (10th Cir. 1992); see reasonableness of Dejavue's fee request. Because the
JaneL. v. Bangerter,6\ F.3d 1505, 1512 (10th Cir. record supports the trial court's award of attorney
1996) ("If claims are related, failure on some claims fees, we cannot say the trial court clearly exceeded
should not preclude full recovery if plaintiff achieves its permitted discretion in awarding Dejavue $91,668
success on a signi ficant, interrelated claim."); Durant in attorney fees. Therefore, we affirm the trial court's
v. Independent Sch. Dist. No. 16, 990 F.2d 560, 566nilins on this issue.
(10th Cir. 1993) (stating because plaintiffs "claims
III. CROSS-APPEAL
arose out of a common core of facts and involved ^j24
Dejavue cross-appeals the trial court's refusal
related legal theories, the district court may . . . to award prejudgment interest. Under Utah law,
conclude her prevailing party status on . . . [one] prejudgment interest may be awarded to provide full
claim subsumes her failure to succeed [on the compensation for actual loss. See Canyon Countv
other.]"); Sprouse v. Jager, 806 P.2d 219,226 (Utah Store v. Bracey, 781 P.2d414,422 (Utah 1989). The
Ct. App. 1991) ("Because these complex issues were award is proper if the loss is fixed at a definite time
so intertwined, we find the court acted within its and the interest can be calculated with mathematical
discretion in its award of attorney fees").
accuracv. See Coalville Cit\f v. Lundgren, 930 P.2d
1206,1212 (Utah Ct. App. \ 997). However, because
UTAH ADVANCE REPORTS
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of the lack of mathematical certainty, prejudgment K28 Affirmed and remanded.
interest is typically not allowed in actions seeking
equitable relief such as unjust enrichment. See
Michael J. Wilkins, Presiding Judge
Shoreline Dev., Inc. v. Utah County, 835 P.2d 207,
211 (Utah Ct. App. 1992); see also James }29
I CONCUR:
Constructors v. Salt Lake City, 888 P.2d 665, 671
n.4 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) (stat'ing "Utah courts have
Judith M. Billings, Judge
upheld the denial of prejudgment interest in actions
seeking . . . unjust enrichment"); Bailev-Allen Co.. 130
I CONCUR, EXCEPT THAT AS TO
Inc. v. Kurzet, 876 R2d 421, 427 (Utah Ct. App. SECTION n(A) & (B), I CONCUR ONLY IN THE
1994) (concluding "even if quantum meruit is RESULT:
awarded on remand, no prejudgment interest should
be awarded").
Gregory K. Orme, Judge
T|25
In this case, one of the five causes of action
Dejavue submitted to the jury was an unjust
cnriclunent claim. Although the jury awarded
Cite a*
Dejavue $90,871 in compensatory damages, the
383 Utah Adv. Rep. 12
general verdict form did not identify the specific
claims on which the award was based. While an
IN THE
award of prejudgment interest might well be
UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
appropriate under the breach of contract claim, such
an award is highly problematic with respect to the STATE of Utah,
forcible entry, unlawful detainer, and conversion
Plaintiff and Appellee,
claims. However, it would never be appropriate for v.
the unjust enrichment claim presented here, hi this Santos DOMINCUEZ, Jr.,
case, the trial court had no way of knowing under
Defendant and Appellant.
which theory or theories of liability the jury awarded
its verdict. Thus, it was impossible for the trial court No. 981781-CA
to determine to what extent, if any, the jury's damage FILED: December 2, 1999
award was based on Dejavue's unjust enrichment
claim-a claim which is not subject to an award of Second District, Ogden Department
prejudgment interest. See Shoreline Dev., Inc., 835 The Honorable Stanton M. Taylor
P.2d at 211 (rejecting claim for prejudgment interest
on unjust cnriclunent award). Under these ATTORNEYS:
circumstances, because of the lack of mathematical
Jonathan B. Pace, Ogden, for Appellant
certainly, we conclude the trial court correctly denied
Jan Graham, Norman E. Plate, and Jeffrey
Dejavue prejudgment interest.
Gray, Salt Lake City, for Appellee
IV. ATTORNEY FEES ON APPEAL
U26
Finally, Dejavue, having prevailed below, Before Judges Wilkins. Davis, and Orme.
and again on appeal, requests attorney (ccs incurred
in connection with this appeal. Such an award is
77//S opinion is subject to revision before final
clearly within the contemplation of the sublease
publication in the Pacific Reporter.
agreement. See Management Sen's. Corp. v.
Development Assocs. ,617 P.2d 406,409 (Utah 1980) ORME, Judge:
(ruling provision in contract providing for attorney *• 1 Defendant Santos Dominguez, Jr. pled guilty to
fees includes attorney fees incurred by the prevailing burglary, a second degree felonv, in violation of Utah
party on appeal). Accordingly, we award Dejavue Code Ann. § 76-6-202 (19*95). At sentencing,
reasonable attorney fees incurred on appeal, and defendant was ordered to pay restitution both to the
remand for the limited purpose of determining the victim of his crime ajid directly to the victim's
amount of those fees.
insurance company. Defendant appeals the trial
court's order, but only insofar as it required him to
CONCLUSION
1J27
We conclude the trial court properly denied pay restitution to the victim's insurance company. We
U.S. Energy's motion for JNOV, or, in the affirm.
BACKGROUND
alternative, for a new trial. U.S. Energy failed to
object to the admission of the report. Also, because «i2 On September 8, 1996, defendant entered a
U.S. Energy failed to properly marshal the evidence mobile home in Ogden, Utah, viciously assaulted a
supporting the jury's punitive damage award, we minor, then lied the state. The victim underwent
decline to disturb those findings. Further, we hold reconstructive surgery to repair injuries sustained in
that under the sublease agreement, Dejavue was the the assault and accumulated $6,847 in medical bills.
prevailing parly and entitled to "attorney fees The defendant was ultimately arrested in Phoenix,
incurred "in presenting all of its legal theories." Arizona. On February 11,1998, he was extradited to
Moreover, we conclude that the trial court's award of Utah.
altomev fees was reasonable and that the trial court *I3 In exchange for defendant's guilty plea, the State
properly denied Dejavue's request for prejudgment agreed to remain silent at sentencing. At defendant's
interest". Finally, we award Dejavue attorney fees on sentencing hearing, conducted on April 27, 1998,
appeal, and remand for a determination of the defendant was given a prison sentence of one to
fifteen years, which was stayed pending defendant's
amount of those fees.
UTAH ADVANCE REPORTS
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WALTER F. BUGDEN, JR. #480
JAMES E. MORTON, #3739
BUGDEN, COLLINS & MORTON, L.C.
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
4021 South 700 East, Suite 400
Salt Lake City, Utah 84107
Telephone: (801) 265-1888

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
DEJAVUE, INC., a Utah
corporation, KRISTINE C.
SCHULTZ, and ALLISON NORD,
Plaintiffs,

AMENDED JUDGMENT

vs.
U.S. ENERGY CORP.
corporation,

a Wyoming

Civil No.: 960902865CV
Honorable Homer F. Wilkinson

Defendant.
This action came on for trial before the Court and a jury,
the Honorable Homer F. Wilkinson, District Judge presiding, and
the issues having been duly tried and the jury having duly
rendered its verdict,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED:
1.

That the Plaintiff Dejavue, Inc. recover from the

Defendant, U.S. Energy Corp., the sum of $90,871.00 in
compensatory damages, with no pre-judgment interest, but the
compensatory damages shall accrue post-judgment interest, until
satisfied, at the rate of 7.468% per annum.
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2.

In addition, the jury awarded $62,500.00 in punitive

damages, which shall also accrue interest at the said judgment
rate, until satisfied, and shall be distributed in accordance
with Utah Code Ann. §78-18-1(3).
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that Plaintiff
Allison Nord, in her individual capacity, take nothing and that
the action be dismissed on its merits against her.
With respect to the Counterclaim of Defendant U.S. Energy,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that Defendant U.S.
Energy take nothing, and that the Counterclaim be dismissed on
its merits.
Plaintiff Dejavue, Inc. is the prevailing party and shall be
awarded its attorneys' fees in the amount of $91,668.69, which
sum shall accrue post-judgment interest, at the said judgment
rate, until satisfied by Defendant.
DATED this

X

I

day of October, 1998.
BY JHE-COURT:

/
*

HONORABLE HOMER F. WILKINSON
Third District Court Judge
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FILED DISTRICT COURT
Third Judicial District

GCT 21 1998

WALTER F. BUGDEN, JR. #480
JAMES E. MORTON, #3739
BUGDEN, COLLINS & MORTON, L.C.
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
4021 South 700 East, Suite 400
Salt Lake City, Utah 84107
Telephone: (801) 265-1888
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
DEJAVUE, INC., a Utah
corporation, KRISTINE C.
SCHULTZ, and ALLISON NORD,

,
J

Plaintiffs,

ORDER RE: VARIOUS MATTERS

vs.
U.S. ENERGY CORP., a Wyoming
corporation,

Civil No. : 960902865CV
Honorable Homer F. Wilkinson

Defendant.
Having reviewed Defendant's Request for Stay of Proceedings,
the stipulation of Plaintiff to the requested stay, Defendant's
Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict, or in the
Alternative for a New Trial, Defendant's Position with Respect to
Plaintiff's Request for Attorney's Fees as the Prevailing party
(Motion to Reconsider), and all other memoranda submitted by
counsel on these issues, being fully advised in the premises, and
good cause appearing,
IT IS JiEFEBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED:
1.

Defendant's Request for Stay of Proceedings for a Period
1
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of 30 Days after the Court's Determination of the Post-Trial
Motions is hereby granted;
2.

Defendant's Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding the

Verdict, or in the Alternative for a New Trial, is hereby denied;
3.

Defendant's Position with Respect to Plaintiff's Request

for Attorney's Fees as the Prevailing Party in the Within Action
(Motion to Reconsider) is hereby denied; and
4.

Plaintiff's request for attorney's fees in the amount of

$91,668.69 is hereby granted.
DATED this

J-

(

day of October,. 1998.
BY/THE COURT:

HOI^ORA^E^HOMg^*. WILKINSON
T h i r d ' D; i - s t r i c t r ^ o u r t J u d g e
NV? 3M.-V'
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WALTER F. BUGDEN, JR., (480)
JAMES E. MORTON, (3739)
BUGDEN, COLLINS & MORTON
Attorneys for Plaintiffs Dejavue, Inc. arid
4021 South 700 East, Suite 400
Salt Lake City, Utah 84107
Telephone: (801) 265-1888
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

DEJAVUE, INC., a Utah
corporation, KRISTINE C. SCHULTZ,
and ALLISON NORD,
Plaintiffs,
vs.
U. S. ENERGY CORP., a Wyoming
corporation, et al.
Defendant.

ORDER GRANTING ATTORNEY'S
FEES TO PLAINTIFF
DEJAVUE, INC. AS THE
PREVAILING PARTY AND
RULINGS ON VARIOUS OTHER
MATTERS
Civil No. 950902865CV
Judge Homer F. Wilkinson

On July 28, 1998, the Court announced its rulings on various
matters.

Walter F. Bugden, Jr.. appeared in person on behalf of

the Plaintiffs, and Kenneth A. Roberts, participated by telephone
on behalf of the Defendant.
Being fully advised in the premises, having reviewed the
Memoranda submitted by counsel, The Court has ruled and
determined as follows:
1.

The Court denies Plaintiff Dejavuo, Tnr.'s request for

pre-judgment interest.
2.

The Court grants Plaintiff Dejavue post-judgment

interest at the statutory rate of 7.468%.
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3.

Plaintiff Dejavue, Inc. is the prevailing party, and as

such, is granted an award of reasonable attorney's fees, subject
to the following: ^actual trial (as opposed to other litigationrelated) fees shall be awarded only for the time of Dejavue,
Inc.'s lead counsel, Walter F. Bugden, Jr.; and no fees shall be
awarded for Mr. Bugden's travel time to and from Riverton,
Wyoming or Ticaboo, Utah.
4.

Plaintiffs shall be awarded taxable costs authorized by

5.

Costs shall not be awarded for the following items:

law.

6.

a.

Expert witness charges;

b.

Out-of-pocket expenses for meals and lodging; and

c.

Investigator's charges.

Based upon the guidance provided by the Court in the

said July 28th hearing, counsel for the parties are encouraged to
reach a stipulation as to the amount of attorney's fees and costs
which shall be awarded to Plaintiff Dejavue, Inc.
7.

In the event the parties cannot reach such an

agreement, Defendant shall file an objection and supporting
memorandum within ten days of mailing of Plaintiff Dejavue's
revised fee request and Plaintiff Dejavue shall file any reply
within ten days of receipt of such an objective.
8

The Defendant's Motion for Sanctions is denied.

9.

The Court will enter a Judgment in the amount of the

compensatory damages plus the amount of punitive awarded by the
2
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jury.

That Judgment will be augmented by the award of attorney's

fees and costs when that determination is made by the Court.
DATED this

//

&aygti&&&?$p&998
AlJ}.'

;££••"+Stirs.

\-7^\

THE COURT:

JORABLE HOMER F. WILKINSON

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

On the Jfr^May of July, 1998, I certify that I caused to be
mailed in the United States Mail, postage prepaid, a true and
correct copy of the Order Granting Attorney's Fees to Plaintiff
Dejavue, Inc. as the Prevailing Party and Rulings on Various
Other Matters to the following:
Kenneth A. Roberts
The Malo Mansion
500 East Eighth Avenue
Denver, Colorado 80203
Wayne Wadsworth
1338 Foothill Drive, #275
Salt Lake City, Utah 84108
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H U D DISTRICT COURT
Third Judicial District

WALTER F. BUGDEN, JR. #480
JAMES E. MORTON, #3739
BUGDEN, COLLINS & MORTON, L.C.
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
4021 South 700 East, Suite 400
Salt Lake City, Utah 84107
Telephone: (801) 265-1888

OCT 2 J 1998
OoputyCtorif

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
DEJAVUE, INC., a Utah
corporation, KRISTINE C.
SCHULTZ, and ALLISON NORD,
Plaintiffs,

)
1
I
1

FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW RE:
AWARD OF ATTORNEYS' FEES
TO PREVAILING PARTY

vs.
U.S. ENERGY CORP., a Wyoming
corporation,

Civil No.: 960902865CV
I

Honorable Homer F. Wilkinson

Defendant.
Plaintiff Dejavue's Motion for an Award of its Attorneys'
Fees and Costs, as the prevailing party in this matter, came on
for hearing before the Honorable Homer F. Wilkinson on July 28,
1998.

Walter F. Bugden, Jr. appeared on behalf of Plaintiff,

Dejavue, Inc., and Kenneth Roberts appeared, via telephone, on
behalf of Defendant.

Having reviewed all relevant pleadings

submitted by the parties on this issue, the Court granted
Dejavue's Motion for an Award of its Attorneys' Fees and Costs,
subject to certain limitations, but did not make a determination
as to the precise amount to be awarded.
1
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The Court urged counsel to reach a stipulation with respect
to the amount of fees and costs to be awarded to Plaintiff
Dejavue.

The Court further directed counsel that, in the event

the parties were unable to reach such a stipulation, .Defendant
should file an objection and supporting memorandum, and Plaintiff
should file a reply thereto.
The parties failed to reach a Stipulation regarding the
amount of fees and costs to be awarded to Plaintiff Dejavue;
consequently, the parties submitted Memoranda to the Court
setting forth the parties' respective positions as to the amount
of fees and costs to be awarded in this matter.

The Court having

received and reviewed all pleadings submitted by the parties on
this issue, having reviewed all evidence submitted in support of
said pleadings, and being fully advised in the premises, hereby
makes the following:
FINDINGS OF FACT:
A.
1.

BASIS FOR AWARD OF FEES
Plaintiff, Dejavue, Inc. (hereinafter "Dejavue") and

Defendant U.S. Energy Corp. entered into a written Sublease
Agreement.
2.

Dejavue brought claims against Defendant for, inter

alia, breach of the Sublease Agreement.
3.

Defendant brought a counterclaim against Dejavue for

breach of the Sublease Agreement.

2
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4.

The terms of the subject Sublease Agreement provide that

the landlord (Defendant) shall be able to recover its attorneys
fees and costs incurred in, inter alia, recovering damages
arising from a breach of the Sublease Agreement.
5.

Utah Code Ann. §78-27-56.5 provides in relevant part

that a court may award costs and attorneys' fees to either party
that prevails in a civil action based upon a written contract,
when the provisions of the written contract "allow at least one
party to recover attorney's fees."
6.

At trial, the Jury found in Dejavue's favor with respect

to its claims against Defendant and awarded Dejavue $90,871.00 in
compensatory damages and $62,500 in punitive damages.
7.

With respect to Defendant's counterclaim for breach of

the Sublease Agreement, the Jury returned a "no cause of action"
verdict in Dejavue's favor.
8.

With respect to Plaintiff Nord's Intentional Infliction

of Emotional Distress claim against Defendant, the jury returned
a "no cause of action" verdict in U.S. Energy's favor.
9.

Based upon the Jury's verdict, che Court finds Dejavue

to be the prevailing party in this matter.
B.

EVIDENCE SUBMITTED IN SUPPORT OF FEE REQUEST

10.

In support of its Motion for An Award cf Attorneys'

Fees and Costs to Prevailing Pariy 'hereinafter "Motion"),
Dejavue submitted billing statements detailing and documenting
the legal services provided by Dejavue's counsel in this matter,
3
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including the number of hours worked by each of Dejavue's
attorneys, the type of work performed and the hourly fee charged
by each attorney.
11.

Dejavue also submitted the Affidavits of Dejavue's

attorneys, Walter F. Bugden, Jr., James E. Morton, Jeffrey S.
Williams and Tara L. Isaacson, attesting to the accuracy of each
respective attorney's billing statements and detailing the work
performed by each attorney.
12.

Walter F. Bugden Jr. worked 3 55.58 hours, including

trial time, at the rate of $175.00 for a total fee of $62,226.50;
Mr. Morton spent 57.50 hours in litigating and preparing this
case for trial, excluding his trial time, at the hourly rate of
$175.00

for a total fee of $10,062.50; Mr. Williams spent 28.00

hours in litigating and preparing this case for trial, excluding
his trial time, at the hourly rate of $150.00 for a total fee of
$4,200.00; associates Jacquelynn D. Carmichael and Tara L.
Isaacson assisted in the preparation of this case for trial and
spent 7 and 55.67 hours respectively at the hourly rates of
$125.00 and $100.00, respectively, for total fees of $875.00 and
$5,567.00 respectively.
13.

In support of its Motion, Dejavue also submitted the

Affidavits of three local attorneys specializing in civil trial
work, to wit:

Brent V. Manning, Richard D. Burbidge and Robert

A. Peterson.

These Affiants each have between 20 and 26 years of

civil trial experience.

Based upon their experience in civil
4
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trial work, their extensive review of the billing statements of
Dejavue's attorneys and their familiarity with the hourly rates
charged by attorneys in this locality, these Affiants attested to
the reasonableness of the hourly fees charge.d by Dejavue's
respective counsel, the reasonableness of the number of hours

-

expended by each attorney working on this case and the
reasonableness of Dejavue's total attorneys' fee incurred in this
matter.
C.

EVIDENCE SUBMITTED IN OPPOSITION TO FEE REQUEST

14.

In response to Dejavue's Motion, Defendant failed to

offer any evidence to refute the reasonableness of Dejavue's Fee
Request, including the reasonableness of the amount of the hourly
fees charged and/or the reasonableness of the number of hours
expended by Dejavue's counsel in this matter.
15.

Instead, Defendant presented arguments that Dejavue was

not the prevailing party in this matter and that the Sublease
Agreement giving rise to this action did not provide a basis for
Dejavue's recovery of its attorney's fees.
D.

ALLOCATION ISSUES AFFECTING FEE AWARD

16.

At the hearing on July 28, 1998, the Court instructed

Dejavue to revise its'fee request to exclude Mr. Bugden's travel
time to and from'Tiverton, Wyoming and/or Ticaboo, Utah and to
exclude the trial fees generated by Mr. Bugden's two trial cocounsel, Mr. Morton and Mr. Williams.

5
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17.

The Court has reviewed Dejavue's "Revised Attorneys

Fees and Costs Request11 (hereinafter "Revised Fee Request") and
finds that the Request has been revised in accordance with the
instructions given by the Court.
18.

In addition, the Court finds that Dejavue's counsel has

subtracted from the Revised Fee Request those fees incurred for
the preparation of Plaintiff Nord's unsuccessful Intentional
Infliction of Emotional Distress claim.
19.

With the exception of Plaintiff Nord's intentional

infliction of emotional distress claim, the claims advanced by
Plaintiff Dejavue, and interposed as defenses to the
counterclaims, were based on inter-related legal theories and
arose from a common core of facts.
20.

In order to defend against the breach of contract

counterclaim, Dejavue was entitled to show the fact-finder that
Defendant, not Dejavue, breached the sub-lease agreement by
forcibly evicting Dejavue, converting its property and unjustly
benefitting from the eviction by using Dejavue's restaurant
equipment for approximately two years.
21.

Evidence presented by Dejavue in defense of the

counterclaims for breach of contract and conversion had a direct
bearing on Dejavue's claims for eviction, conversion and breach
of the sublease agreement which it asserted against Defendant.
22.

Each of Dejavue's claims submitted to the jury was

intertwined with its defense of the breach of contract and
6
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conversion counterclaims and arose from a common core of facts.
23.

After examining the evidence submitted by Dejavue in

support of its Revised Fee Request, including memoranda, billing
statements, Affidavits of Dejavue's counsel and the Affidavits of
Messrs. Manning, Burbidge and Peterson, the Court finds Dejavue's
Revised Fee Request to be reasonable in every respect.
E.

FACTORS CONSIDERED IN DETERMINING A "REASONABLE" FEE

24.

The factors considered by this Court in determining

what constitutes a "reasonable" attorneys fee include the
difficulty of the litigation; the efficiency of the attorneys in
presenting the case; the fee customarily charged in the locality
for similar services; the overall result attained and the
expertise and experience of the attorneys involved.
125.

Difficulty of the Litigation.

This case involved a claim by Plaintiff for seven

separate causes of action against Defendant and a counterclaim by
Defendant for four separate causes of action against Plaintiff.
Plaintiff's case involved complex commercial, contractual,
landlord/tenant and tort issues and required its present counsel
to do a great deal of legal work in a short,, very condensed
period of time.
26.

The litigation of the subject matter was difficult due

to the fact that Dejavue's counsel was retained on the f.ve of the
originally scheduled trial date and the fact that Dejavue's
counsel were required to do extensive pre-trial preparation,
7
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including drafting court submissions, amassing numerous
documents, categorizing numerous documents, familiarizing
themselves with over 400 pages of exhibits, organizing exhibit
books for the jury and the Court, developing witness .testimony,
arguing Summary Judgment motions and preparing for a five-day
jury trial, all within a six-week period of time.
27.

Dejavue's lead counsel was required to immediately and

completely immerse himself in the preparation of the case for
trial, to the near exclusion of his other cases and clients.

The

amount of time and man-power required to prepare this case for
trial was enormous because the case was document intensive,
aggressively defended, and involved numerous percipient
witnesses.
2.
28.

Efficiency of Attorneys Presenting the Case.

The Court finds that due to the complex and document-

intensive nature of the case, and the short time in which to
prepare it for trial, Dejavue's lead counsel reasonably required
the assistance of other lawyers in order to adequately prepare
the case for trial.
29.

The number of hours expended by each of Dejavue's

attorneys in preparing this case for trial was reasonable and
necessary.
30.

The legal services and task^: performed by each of

Dejavue's respective attorneys in preparing this case for trial
were reasonable and necessary,
8
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31.

Dejavue's attorneys were efficient in their division of

labor and tasks and in the number of hours they spent in
preparing this case for trial.
32.

The Court finds, however, that only one attorney was

reasonably needed to represent Dejavue during the actual trial of
this matter and limits Dejavue's recovery of its attorneys fees
for trial time to the trial time of lead counsel, Walter F.
Bugden, Jr. only.
3.
33.

Customary Fee in Locality for Similar Services.

The Court finds that the hourly fees charged by

Dejavue's respective counsel, in the amounts of $175.00 for
Messrs. Bugden and Morton; $150.00 for Mr. Williams and $100.00
for Tara Isaacson are reasonable and customary in the Salt Lake
City locality for the type of civil litigation and trial work
performed in this matter.
34.

The Court acknowledges the Affidavits of Messrs.

Manning, Burbidge and Peterson, recognizes these attorneys to be
experienced civil litigation and trial attorneys with an
awareness of the customary fees charged in this locality for the
kind of work performed by Dejavue's counsel and finds their
opinions, with respect to the reasonableness of the fees charged
and work performed in this matter, to be helpful and valid.
4.
35.

Overall Result Obtained.

Dejavue's attorneys obtained a favorable result for

their client.

Specifically, Dej avue prevailed on its claims
9
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against Defendant and received a jury verdict in its favor in the
amount of $90,871.00 in compensatory damages.
36.

Dejavue's attorneys were also successful in defending

Defendant's counterclaims which the Jury found to be nonmeritorious and rendered a verdict of "no cause of action" with
respect to the same.
37.

Finally, Dejavue's attorneys prevailed in the punitive

damages portion of the trial as well and obtained an award of
$62,500.00 in punitive damages for their client.
5.
38.

Experience and Expertise of Counsel.

The Court further finds that the hourly fees charged by

each of Dejavue's attorneys is reasonable based upon each
attorney's respective level of litigation experience and
expertise.

Specifically, Mr. Bugden and Mr. Morton have

extensive trial experience and have been practicing law for 21
and 16 years respectively.

An hourly fee of $175.00 is a

reasonable fee for these experienced, seasoned lawyers. Mr.
Williams, as a civil litigator of seven years is entitled to the
reasonable hourly fee of $150.00 for his time, and Ms. Isaacson's
reduced hourly fee of only $100.00 is reasonable for a litigation
lawyer with two years of experience.
39.

The Court has reviewed Dejavue's "Revised Attorneys

Fees and Costr Request1' itemizing Dejavue's attorneys' fees in
the amount of $91,668.69 and finds the Fee Request to be
reasonable and recoverable in its entirety.
10
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BASED upon the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court now
makes the following Conclusions of Law:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW:
1.

This matter is a civil action based upon a written

contract that allows at least one party to recover its attorneys' "
fees.
2.

Section 19.02 of the Sublease Agreement entered into by

Dejavue, Inc. and U.S. Energy Corp. in conjunction with Utah Code
Ann., §78-27-56.5 provides the legal basis for Dejavue's recovery
of its attorneys' fees and costs in this matter.
3.

Plaintiff Dejavue, Inc. is the prevailing party in this

matter; Dejavue prevailed on its claims against Defendant in
achieving a Jury verdict in its favor in the amount of $90,871.00
in compensatory damages and $62,500 in punitive damages, as well
as in its defense of Defendant's breach of contract counterclaim,
for which the Jury returned a finding of "no cause of action".
4.

The jury's verdict of "no cause of action" for the

Defendant on its breach of contract counterclaim was,
necessarily, a finding in favor of Plaintiff Dejavue, Inc. on its
breach of contract claim.
5.

Plaintiff Dejavue, Inc. was the prevailing party on both

its breach of. ccnt/act claim and in its defense of the
Defendant's breach of contract counterclaim.
6.

Dejavue's claims against Defendant and Defendant's

counterclaims against Plaintiff derive from a common core of
11
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facts; as a result, the prosecution of Dejavue's claims
necessarily intertwined and overlapped with its successful
defense of Defendant's counterclaims.
7.

Due to the overlap of Dejavue's legal theories and the

common core of facts giving rise to all of Dejavue's claims
against Defendant, as well as Defendant's counterclaims against
Dejavue, Dejavue is entitled to be compensated for the reasonable
attorneys fees incurred in presenting all of its legal theories.
8.

Plaintiff Nord did not prevail on her intentional

infliction of emotional distress claim and is not entitled to
recover her attorneys fees incurred in prosecuting that claim.
9.

The hourly rates charged by Dejavue's respective

attorneys are reasonable based upon the experience and expertise
of Dejavue's counsel, the customary rates charged in this
locality, the overall result obtained, the difficulty of the
litigation and the efficiency of Dejavue's counsel.
10.

The amount of work performed by Dejavue's counsel in

this matter in prosecuting Dejavue's claims and in defending U.S.
Energy's counterclaims was reasonable and necessary.
11.

Dejavue's Fee Request is reasonable in every respect

and is adequately supported by the evidence submitted by counsel.
.12.

Dejavue, Inc. is entitled to and is hereby awarded its

attorneys' fees in the amount of $91,668.69, and the Judgment
entered herein on August 11, 1998 is hereby augmented in that
amount.
12
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V
DATED this

XL

day of October, 1998.
BY^HE COURT:

/
'

HONO&AgLE H0ME^>1*ILKINS0N
T h i i ^ D i s t r i c t " Cxpugt|\ Judge
w

•) n
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SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH; TUESDAY, JULY 28, 1998
-000O000-

THE COURT:

Good morning, Mr. Roberts.

MR. ROBERTS:
Wilkinson.

Yeah, that sounds like Judge

How are you, sir?

THE COURT:

This is Judge Wilkinson, and

Mr. Bugden is here in the office.
MR. ROBERTS:
THE COURT:
have been brought.

All right.

There's a number of motions which

I want to give you my rulings on them.

I wanted to talk to you because there's going to be some
further material which you people are going to have to

—

are going to go into.
First of all, the question that came up as far as
pre-judgment interest, the Court is of the opinion that the
way the verdict was framed with the —

the general verdict,

that it did not break down as to what the damages were for.
I know that the Utah law provides for pre-judgment interest
on special damages and personal injury cases and that it
would probably carry over to a case like this.

This Court

has no way of knowing what are special damages or what may
be general damages.
Therefore, the' Court would deny pre-judgment
interest.

But if we were to grant it, it would be at the

rate of 10 per cent, which is the statutory rate.
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The Court would grant post-judgment interest at
the rate of 7.468 per cent, which is according to statute.
MR. BUGDEN:

What is that rate, Judge?

THE COURT:

7.468.

statute, except the —

That's the —

as set by

that's just given to me.

The Court would also grant to the plaintiff
attorney fees.

But the Court would also put the

responsibility on the defense to raise issues as far as
what attorney fees are good and what are not good.

In

other words, the Court is looking at this:
The Court would not grant attorney fees for the
representation of Nord.

That was not under contract, and

attorney fees can only be awarded by contract, and that was
for Dejavue.

The Court would also not be inclined to award

attorney fees for three attorneys sitting five days at
trial.

The Court would also not be inclined to award

attorney fees for the time Mr. Bugden spent while traveling
to and from Ticaboo and so forth and whatever took place
there.

And that's something that, as I say, counsel,

Mr. Roberts, you're going to have to go into this affidavit
and give the Court some direction on it.
MR. ROBERTS:
THE COURT:

All right, sir,

The Court would also award to the

plaintiff taxable costs.

And taxable costs, those that are

awarded by statute are, of course, case law.
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The Court is

1

not inclined and, again, I put the burden on the defense to

2

go over the cost bill and to give any objection.

3

Court's not inclined to award expert witness fees, just be

4

the statutory fee.

5

as to the attorney fees and the cost involved by Richards,

6

Brandt and —

7

firm that was in the case before.

But the

The Court would want more information

and whatever the rest of the name is. The

8

The Court would also not be inclined to award

9

costs for the travel and the meals and the lodging, the

10

expenses involved in the travel to Ticaboo and Riverton and

11

so forth.

12

attorney fees for the investigation fee.

The Court would also not be inclined to award

Now, there may be others, but those are just the

13
14

ones that I just looked at that do not —

15

under —

16
17

they're not under the taxable costs.
The Court would also deny the defendant's motions

for sanctions.

18

Any questions?

19

MR. ROBERTS:

20

yet on the case?

Judge, have you entered a judgment

I understand you have not.

21

THE COURT:

22

MR. ROBERTS:

23

that are not just

I have not.
Okay.

Would you be waiting until

after we finish this process before you do that?

24

THE COURT:

Well

25

MR. ROBERTS:

—

I just want to make sure we don't
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get —

I don't get particularly cross-wise with the timing

and everything.
THE COURT:

Well, in cases, many times, where

disputes come up, I tell counsel that if they want the
post-judgment interest to commence to run, I will enter
judgment for the amount of which the jury awarded, that all
other amounts would be added to it, such as costs and
and attorney fees.

—

And, of course, the post-judgment

interest would not run on that anyway.

Therefore, the

judgment could be entered but the other matters would be
resolved as you get some time to give me some law on them.
MR. ROBERTS:

Okay.

So —

okay.

just wait until we hear from you or —

Then I guess we

whether the

plaintiffs want to have it done right away.
THE COURT:
MR. BUGDEN:

Well, Mr. Bugden's here.
Well, we will.

I'll prepare a

judgment.
THE COURT:

Then just a judgment as far as the

verdict of the jury, that alone, and the Court will execute
it as soon as that comes in.

And then I will wait to hear

from you as far as anything as far as attorney fees or as
far as costs.
And I hope, counsel, please, I know you've had
your differences, but I hope that you can talk a little bit
about this and resolve one of these matters without the

6
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Court's getting involved in it.
matters are —

Because a lot of these

are statutory case law as far as what

attorney fees can be granted and what costs can be granted.
MR. ROBERTS:
THE COURT:

Okay, Judge.

But who's going to prepare an order

for this hearing?
MR. BUGDEN:
THE COURT:

I will.
Okay.

MR. ROBERTS:

No.

Any other questions?
And I would just ask that any

orders that Mr. Bugden's office prepares be sent to me,
faxed, preferably.
THE COURT:
will —

Now, I'm sure he will do that.

But I

and I'm telling Mr. Bugden now to prepare the

judgment just as the jury verdict, and I will execute that
as soon as that comes in, if that meets with the Court's
approval.
MR. ROBERTS:
THE COURT:

Okay.

MR. ROBERTS:
THE COURT:

Very good, judge.

All right.

Thank you, Mr. Roberts.

Thank you, Mr. Bugden.
MR. BUGDEN:

Thank you.

Yeah.

Any questions?

Actually, could you tell me

again, so I understand, why you're not going to award prejudgment interest?
THE COURT:

Because I think pre-judgment interest
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can only be awarded on special damages and that —
and that's taken from the —

that

—

there's a statute, see, for

personal injury cases, pre-judgment interest can be awarded
on special damages.
MR. BUGDEN:
THE COURT:

Okay.
And this, I don't know what's special

damages and what are general damages.
MR- BUGDEN:
THE COURT:

Okay.

Thanks.

Okay.

(Whereupon, the hearing was concluded.)
-000O000-
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F

ft!?, D / S JWCT COURT
Third Jud/cfef D/s!rte? r

Oeputy ctetk~

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
-00O00-

DEJAVUE, lEKTTUTaTrcoTporation,
KR4ST4N£-G^£CHUtT-Z and ALLISON
NORD,
GENERAL VERDICT
Plaintiffs,
Civil No. 960902865
Honorable Judge Wilkinson

v.
U.S. ENERGY CORP., a Wyoming
corporation,
Defendant.

-ooOoo—
We, the jury in the above-entitled action, find in favor of the plaintiff Allison Nord
and against the defendant, and assess the plaintiffs damages at S
DATED this \] ^ day of June, 1998.

BY
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.

IN THE DISTRICT COURT FOR THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT ,
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, COUNTY OF UTAH
^ ; 2 ®98

DEJAVUE, INC., a Utah, corporation,
KRISTINE C. SCHULTZ and,
ALLISON NORD

GENERAL
DEFENDANT
Plaintiffs,

vs.
U.S. ENERGY CORP., a Wyoming corporation,

Civil No. 960902865CV
Judge Homer F. Wilkinson

We, the jury duly impaneled in the above entitled action, find the issues in favor
of the defendant and award damages in favor of the defendant and against the plaintiffs
in the sum of $

Q)

.

Dated this / Z - day of June, 1998

Foreperson
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JUN ! 2 1998

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
-00O00-

(^pjjAVLLEJIjC^a Utah corporation^
KRI'ST I N E C / S C R D ! 11 and ALLISON
NORD,
GENERAL VERDICT
Plaintiffs,
Civil No. 960902865
Honorable Judge Wilkinson
U.S. ENERGY CORP., a Wyoming
corporation,
Defendant.

-ooOoo—
We, the jury in the above-entitled action, find in favor of the plaintiff Dejavue, Inc.
and against the defendant, and assess the plaintiffs damages at $_
DATED this IZ

day of June, 1998.
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F

Th l £ D / STR,c T COURT
Third Judicial District

IN THE DISTRICT COURT FOR THE THIRD JUDICIAL Dl£Efc]£2fl398
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, COUNTY OF UTi
By.

DEJAVUE, INC., a Utah, corporation,
KRISTINE C. SCHULTZ and,
ALLISON NORD

G£!«fcAL VERDICT FOR
PLAINTIFF^ p±/4ts*-<;Jfrc~
Plaintiffs,

vs.
U.S. ENERGY CORP., a Wyoming corporation,

Civil No. 960902865CV
Judge Homer F. Wilkinson

We, the jury duly impaneled in the above entitled action, find the issues in favor
of the plaintiffs^and award damages in favor of the plaintiffs^d against the defendant
in the sum of $

(j>2, ^OQ •

Dated this / £ . day of June, 1998

Foreperson

[/rffi??
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
-00O00-

DEJAVUE, INC. a Utah corporation,
KRISTINE C. SCHULTZ and ALLISON
NORD,

v-e-

GENEft&L VERDICT
Plaintiffs,
Civil No. 950902865
Honorable Judge Wilkinson
U.S. ENERGY CORP., a Wyoming
corporation,
Defendant.

-00O00—

f

4- in favor of the plaintiff A&sorrftfard
We, the jury in the above-entitled action/find
i 4fl4-a§amsHfce-^ef^fit r a»d-assess4ke^^
DATED this

day of June, 1998.

BY
FOREPERSON
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CONSOLIDATED BALANCE SHEETS
ASSETS
May 31,
1997
CURRENT ASSETS:
Cash and cash equivalents
Accounts and notes receivable (Note C):
Trade, net of allowance for doubtful
accounts of $30,900 and $27,800, respectively
Related parties (Note C)
Current portion of long-term
notes receivable (Notes F and L )
Assets held for resale and other
Inventory
TOTAL CURRENT ASSETS
INVESTMENTS AND ADVANCES (Notes E and F):
Affiliates
Restricted investments
INVESTMENT IN CONTINGENT STOCK
PURCHASE WARRANT (Note F)
PROPERTIES AND EQUIPMENT (Notes B, C, D and F):
Land and mobile home park
Buildings and improvements
Aircraft and related equipment
Developed oil and gas properties, full cost method
Undeveloped gas properties
Mineral properties and mine development costs
Less accumulated depreciation, depletion
and amortization
OTHER ASSETS:
Accounts and notes receivable:
Real estate sales, net of valuation
allowance of S926.300 at
May 31,1997 (Notes F and L)
Employees (Note C)
Other
Deposits and other

$

1996

1,416.900

S

992.600

368.200
1,191.000

570.900
281.800

337,200
991,600
96.000
4,400,900

438,700
509,700
118.700
2,912,400

4,999,600
8.506 300
13,505,900

3.658.500
8.200.800
11,859.300

4.594.000

--

939,000
5,986,800
5.627,900
1,769.900
519.400
14.843.00H

939,000
6,243,100
6,650,100
1,769,800
135.400
10.956.900
?6,694,300

(8.802.100)
6,040,900

(9.047.900)
17,646,400

394,000
745,300
338,600
36/.500
1.845.400
30.387.100

974,200
532,400
674,700
193.900
2.375.200
34793.300
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US. ENERGY CORP. AND AFFILIATES
CONSOLIDATED BALANCE SHEETS
LIABILITIES AND SHAREHOLDERS' EQUITY
May 31.
1997
CURRENT LIABILITIES:
Accounts payable and accrued expenses
Lines of credit (Note G;
Current portion of long-term debt (Note G)
TOTAL CURRENT LIABILITIES

S

1.312,600

199i

81.300
1.393,900

1.292.300
499.000
239.900
2,031.200

183.100

444,300

RECLAMATION LIABILITY (Notes F and K)

8.751.800

3,978,800

OTHER ACCRUED LIABILITIES (Note F)

5.259.000

10,414,300

183.300

183.300

LONG-TERM DEBT (Note G)

DEFERRED TAX LIABILITY (Note H)

$

COMMITMENTS AND CONTINGENCIES (Ncie K)
MINORITY INTERESTS
FORFEITABLE COMMON STOCK.
S.01 par value, issued 223.900 and
195,520 shares, respectively, forfeitable
until earned (Note J)
SHAREHOLDERS'EQUITY (Note J):
Preferred stock. S01 par value: autho-lzed.
100,000 shares; none issued or outstanding
Common stock. S.01 par value; authorized,
20,000.000 shares; issued 6,646.475 and
6.324,306 shares, respectively
Additional paid-in capital
Accumulated deficit
Treasury stock at cost. 690,943 and
769,943 shares, respectively
Unallocated ESOP contribution
S

-

1,637,900

1.892.400

1.486,500

66.500
22.543.000
(6.776.900)

63,100
20.775.700
(3,052,400)

(2,182,000)
(927.000)
12.723.600
30.387.100

(2,242,400)
(927.000)
14.617.000
34.793.300
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CONSOLIDATED STATEMENTS OF OPERATIONS
Year Ended May 31.
1996

1997

REVENUES:

$

Mineral sales and option (Note E)
Construction contract revenues
Commercial operations
Distribution from affiliate in excess of cost basis
Oil sales
Gain on sales of assets (Notes D and F)
Royalties from mineral properties agreements (Note F)
Interest
Management fees and other (Note C)
COSTS AND EXPENSES:
Cost of minerals sold
Mineral operations
Construction costs
Commercial operations
Oil production
Provision (or doubtful accounts
General and administrative
Gas operations
Abandonment of mineral interests
Loss on sale of investments
Interest
LOSS BEFORE MINORITY INTEREST IN LOSS. EQUITY IN
LOSS OF AFFILIATES AND INCOME TAXES
MINORITY INTEREST IN LOSS OF CONSOLIDATED SUBSIDIARIES
EQUITY IN LOSS OF AFFILIATES
LOSS BEFORE INCOME TAXES

S

INCOME TAXES (Note H)

WET INCOME (LOSS) PER SHARE

3.116.700
3.794.500
1.439.100
—
210.100
352.200
619.400
100.200
9.632.200

—
843.100
752,600
3.059.600
96.800
614.200
2,763.300
1.225.800
140.800
9.496.200

2.766.700
805.600
3.077,800
2.374.800
73,000
—
2,524.700
~
328,700
205.000
12.156.300

••
1.654,300
1,038,300
2.070,100
78,100
—
1,860.600
206.600
—
90.000
180.300
7.178.300

(3.706.000)

(2.524.100)

(2.577,700)

672.300

608.700

653,200

(690.800)

(418.500)

(442.300)

(3.724.500)

!

S

s

$

1.303.400
1.177.600
_
194.500
1.282.400
85.500
469,900
87.300
4.600.600

S

(2,366,800)
-_

(2.333.900)

(2,366,800)

-

308.900

296,200

..

2.295.700

(3.724,500)
(.55)
..

s_.
s

.,
$

(2.333.900)

S

--_

(3.724,500)

DISCONTINUED OPERATIONS:
Income from discontinued operations.
net of income taxes of $0
Gain on disposal of subsidiary operations in discontinued
segment, net of income taxes of S50.000

INCOME (LOSS) PER SHARE AMOUNTS:
Loss before discontinued operations
Income from discontinued operations
Gain on disposal of subsidiary
operating in discontinued segment

1,038.600
2.219,400
1.003.800
164.600
39.400
207.300
693,300
423.800
5.790.200

-JL_

LOSS BEFORE DISCONTINUED OPERATIONS

NET INCOME (LOSS)

$

1995

270.700

(38)
.05

L_

(2.070,600)

s

(.48)
.06

i_

Ld2)

M
^

L_

M
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US. ENERGY CORP. AND AFFILIATES
CONSOLIDATED STATEMENTS OF SHAREHOLDERS' EQUITY

Balance May 31.1994
Funding of ESOP
Issuance of common stock
through private placement
(Note J)
Issuance of common stock
to third party for
services rendered
Issuance of common stock
for exercised option
Issuance of common stock
to buyout third party
in property venture
Wet loss
Balance May 31.1995
Funding ot ESOP
Issuance of common stock
through private placement
Issuance of additional common
shares in connection
ivith prior year
private placement
Cancellation of common stock
issued for services rendered
Issuance of common stock to
employees for a bonus
Issuance of common stock for
exercised warrants
Fair value of warrants issued
above exercise price
Issuance of common stock for
exercised option
Dilution of investment
in subsidiary
Met income (loss)
Balance. May 31.1996
Funding of ESOP
Issuance of common stock lor
exercised warrants
Fair value of warrants issued
above exercise price
Issuance of common stock
for services rendered
Issuance of common stock for
exercised option
Purchase of treasury stock
Shares of USE stock
held by subsidiary
no longer consolidated
Met loss
Balance,May31.1997

Common Stock
Shares
Amount
4,693,090 S 46.800
37,204

400

4.000

400.000

5.000
107,500

1.100

Additional
Paid-in
Capital
S16,784.800

(Accumulated
Deficit)
Earnings
$ (1,185.800)

Treasury Stock
Shares
Amount
713.276 $ (2.072.400)

Unallocated
ESOP
Contribution
$ (1,014.300)

199,600

200,000
56.667

1.196.000

(170,000)

1,030,000

23.100

23.100

345.700

346,800

20.000
200
79.800
^
^_
;!_
(2 070 600)
5.262.794 S 52.533 S18.629.000 $ (3.256.400)

:i_
769943

n_
S (2.242.400)

r_
$ (1.014.300)
87.300

812.432

8.100

133.336

i 300

(5.000)

Total
Shareholders'
Equity,
S12.559.100

2.634.100

65.400

80.000
(2070600)
S12.168.400
87,300
2.842,200

(66,700)

(23.100)

(23.100)

32.901

533

180.600

180.900

81.243

£33

389.100

389.900

41.700

41.700

41.400

41.500

6.600

"00

(1.382.500)
6.324,306

S 63.100

24.069

200
1.800

180,000

$20,775,700

270.700
S (3.052.400)

769.943

$ (2,242,400) S

(927,000)

213.400

213.600

898.200

900.000

148.300

148,300
138.500

12,000

200

138,300

106,100

1,200

369.100
21,000

(235.600)

(100.000)

296.000

370.300
(235.600)

296.000
3.724.500)

(3.724.500)
6 646.475

S 66500

(1.382.500)
270.700
$14,617,000

$22543000

$ (6776.900)

690.943

$ (2.182 000)

$ (927.000)

$12 723.600
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CONSOLIDATED STATEMENTS OF CASH FLOWS

1997
CASH FLOWS FROM OPERATING ACTIVITIES:
Net income (loss)
Adjustments to reconcile net income (loss) to net cash
used in operating activities:
Minority interest in loss of
consolidated subsidiaries
Income from discontinued operations
Depreciation, depletion and amortization
Abandoned mineral claims
Equity in loss from affiliates
Distribution from affiliate in excess of cost basis
Gain on sale of assets
Provision for doubtful accounts
Loss on sale of marketable
equity securities
Gain on sale of subsidiary
Non-cash proceeds from sale of subsidiary
Common stock issued to fund ESOP
Non-cash compensation
Common stock and warrants issued for services
Other
Net changes in:
Accounts receivable
Other assets
Accounts payable and accrued expenses
Reclamation and other liabilities
Deferred tax liability
NET CASH USED IN OPERATING ACTIVITIES
CASH FLOWS FROM INVESTING ACTIVITIES:
Development of mining properties
Development of gas properties
Proceeds from sale of subsidiary
Proceeds from sale of property and equipment
Proceeds from sale of investments
Purchases of property and equipment
Changes in notes receivable, net
Distribution from affiliate
Investments in affiliates
Reduction in cash due to deconsolidation of subsidiary
NET CASH (USED IN) PROVIDED dY
INVESTING ACTIVITIES

$ (3,724,500)

Year Ended May 31.
1996
$

1995

270.700

$ (2.070.600)

(608.700)
(308,900)
788,500
328.700
418,500
~
(352,200)
—

(653.200)
(296,200)
724.700
—
442,300
-(1.282.400)
—

._
—
—
213,600
405,900
286,800
150,600

(2,295,700)
607,900
87,300
339,100
(23,100)
(455,600)

90,000.
—
200.000
69.500
23.100
(219,000)

(706,500)
(724,100)
331,700
(355,300)
—
(2.647.600)

88,600
(520,300)
(774,700)
(377,400)
—
(2.787.300)

(415,700)
(96,000)
1,557,700
(412,600)
(117.500)
(2.455.900)

(719,300)
(29,100)
—
273,500
—
(208.600)
(121.400)
4.367.000
(1.413.700)
(484.100)

(763.000)
(42,100)
3,300,000
1,212,900
—
(1.387.300)
(1,102,800)
—
(676,500)
—

(455,100)
(218,200)
—
854,300
199,300
(124.200)
91,800
(627.500)
—

(672.300)
658.900
1,225,800
690,800
(1,003,800)
(39,400)
614,200.

1.664.300

541.200

(Continued)
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The accompanying notes to consolidated financial statements are an integral part of these balance sheets.

(279.600)

US- ENERGY CORP. AND AFFILIATES
CONSOLIDATED STATEMENTS OF CASH FLOWS
(continued)

1997""
CASH FLOWS FROM FINANCING ACTIVITIES:
Proceeds from issuance of common stock
Proceeds from subsidiary .stock sale
Proceeds from long-term debtNet (repayments on) proceeds from lines of credit
Purchase of treasury stock
Repayments of long-term debt
NET CASH PROVIDED BY (USED IN)
FINANCING ACTIVITIES

$

1,270,300
1,106,700
554.400
(499,000)
(235.600)
(789.200)

Year Ended May 31,
1996"
3,273,600

$ 1,376,800

4,212,800
(641,000)

626,400
1,140,000

(3.967.300)

(935.300)

1.407.600

2.878.100

2.207.900

NET INCREASE (DECREASE) IN CASH AND
CASH EQUIVALENTS

424.300

632,000

(527,600)

CASH AND CASH EQUIVALENTS. Beginning of year

992.600

360.600

888.200

S

1.416.900

992.600

S

360.600

$

118.900

$

205.000

$

160.200

$

1.000.000

CASH AND CASH EQUIVALENTS, End of year

$

1335

SUPPLEMENTAL DISCLOSURES:
Interest paid
Income faxes paid
NON-CASH INVESTING AND FINANCING ACTIVITIES:
Notes received for sale of assets
Exchange of common shares
investment in affiliate in exchange
for investment in Contingent Stock
Purchase Warrant

S

4.594000

Issuance of common stock to acquire affiliate
Deconsolidation of subsidiary in 1997:
Other assets
Investment in affiliates
Restricted investment
Property, plant and equipment
Notes payable
Accounts payable and accrued expenses
Minority Interest

$ 1.550.000

$

$

77,600
355.000
27,000
11,560,600

S

185.000
433.900
2,069,900
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SUBLEASE AGREEMENT

THIS SUBLEASE AGREEMENT is made and entered into this 1st day of May, 1995 by and
between Canyon Homesteads, Inc. a Utah corporation, as Trustee for the Ticaboo Townsite Joint
Venture, hereinafter referred to as the "Landlord," and Dejavue, Inc., hereinafter referred to
as the "Tenant".
RECITALS
A.

On the 15th day of September, 1980, the State of Utah, acting through the

Department of Natural Resources, Division of State Lands, now called School and Institutional
Trust Lands Administration ("SITLA") and the Landlord entered into a certain Special Use
Lease Agreement No. 399 (hereinafter the "Base Lease"), whereby the State of Utah leased to
the Landlord certain real propeny (hereinafter the "Shopping Center Property") situated in
Garfield County, State of Utah, and more particularly described in Exhibit A attached hereto and
by this reference made a pan hereof.
B. The Landlord plans to lease a ponion of the Shopping Center Propeny (hereinafter
the "Ticaboo Shopping Center").
C.

The Tenant desires to Lease from the Landlord cenain commercial space in a

building at the Ticaboo Shopping Center for the purpose of operating a restaurant and liquor
lounge, and the Landlord is willing to lease such Space to the Tenant, all on the terms,
covenants, and conditions hereinafter set forth.
NOV/, THEREFORE, in consideration of the mutual covenants and agreements .herein
contained, the Landlord and the Tenant agree as follows:
1. PREMISES. EQUIPMENT AND HARDWARE .

.

1.01. Description of Premises, Equipment and Hardware. For and in consideration of
the rents^ herein reserved and the covenants and agreements herein contained on the pan of the
Tenant to be performed or observed, the Landlord hereby leases and demises to the Tenant,
cenain premises (hereinafter the "Premises") comprising of approximately 4,500 square feet of
floor space in a building and approximately 1,600 square fcec of outdoor patio space adjoining
the same 'building at the Ticaboo Shopping Center, and certain equipment and hardware
(hereinafter referred to as "Restaurant Inventory") for use at and in conjunction with the
Tenant's business at the Premise.* The Premises are shown and cross-hatched in red on the site
plan attached hereto as Exhibit B and the floor plan attached hereto as Exhibit C, both of which
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part thereof, without the prior written consent of the Landlord and SITLA in each specific
Instance. Any attempt by the Tenant to assign or encumber its rights in this Sublease or in the
Premises or to let or sublet the Premises or any pan thereof, without the prior written consent
of the Landlord and SITLA, shall be voidable and, at the Landlord's election, shall constitute
a default by the Tenant under this Sublease. Such prohibition against assigning and subletting
shall include any assignment or subletting by operation of law. No consent to any assignment,
encumbrance, or subletting shalfconstitute a waiver or consent as to any subsequent or further
assignment, encumbrance, or subletting.
18.02. Other Transfers. If the Tenant is a corporation, unincorporated association, or
partnership, then the merger, consolidation, dissolution, liquidadon, withdrawal of partner, or
other reorganization of the Tenant, or the sale, issuance, or other transfer in the aggregate of
a controlling percentage of the capital stock or interest in the Tenant, or the sale of more than
fifty percent(50%) of the value of the Tenant's assets, shall be deemed to be an assignment of
this Sublease for purposed of Section 18.01 above. The phrase "controlling percentage" shall
mean (i) if the Tenant is an unincorporated association or partnership, more than fifty percent
(50 7o) of the total outstanding interests in the Tenant, or (ii) if the Tenant is a corporation, stock
possessing more than fifty percent (50%) of the total combined voting power of all classes of
the Tenant's issued and outstanding capital stock entitled to vote for the election of directors.
18.03. No Concessions. The Tenant shall not have the right to permit any business to
be operated in, at, or from the Premises by any concessionaire or licensee, without the prior
written consent of the Landlord and SITLA in each specific instance.
18.04.

No Release of Tenant.

No consent by the Landlord to any assignment,

encumbrance, subletting, concession, or license shall relieve the Tenant from any obligation orliability of the Tenant under this Sublease, whether accruing before or after such consent,
assignment, subletting, concession, or license. The Landlord's acceptance of rent hereunder
from any party other than the Tenant shall in no event be deemed to be a waiver by the Landlord
and SITLA, of any provision of this Sublease or to be a consent to any assignment,
encumbrance, subletting, or other transfer.
19.

DEFAULT AND REMEDIES.
19.01.

Default bv Tenant. Upon the occurrence of any of the following events, the

Tenant shall be in default under this Sublease:
(a)

Any failure by the Tenant to pay any rent, additional rent, or other amount
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to be paid by the Tenant hereunder when due or within ten (10) days thereafter.
(b)

Any failure by the Tenant to observe or perform any terms, covenants, or

conditions of this Sublease to be observed or performed by the Tenant, if such failure shall
continue for thirty (30) days after written notice thereof to the Tenant; provided, however, that '
if the nature of the default is such that the same cannot reasonably be cured within said thirty
.(30) day period, the Tenant shall not be in default hereunder if the Tenant shall within such
period commence such cure and thereafter diligently prosecute the same to completion.
(c)

Any abandonment or vacation of the Premises by the Tenant. However,

Tenant may vacate or abandon the premises during the Non-Acuve season as defined in
paragraph 2.03 and the same will not constitute a breach of default under the terms of this
agreement. However, prior to leaving the premises, the Tenant shall notify Landlord in writing
that Tenant will return for the Active season as defined in paragraph 2.03.
(d)

The making by the Tenant of any general assignment or arrangement for

the benefit of creditors; the filing by or against the Tenant of a petition to have the Tenant
adjudged a bankrupt or for reorganization or arrangement under any law relating to bankruptcy;
the appointment of a trustee or receiver to take possession of substantially all of the Tenant's
assets located in the Premises or the Tenant's assets located in the Premises or of the Tenant's
interest in this Sublease.
19.02. Nonexclusive Remedies. In the event of any default under this Sublease by the
Tenant, the Landlord shall have the following nonexclusive remedies:
(a)

At its opdon and without waiving any default by the Tenant, the Landlord

shall have the right to continue this Sublease in full force and effect and to collect all rent,
additional rent, and other amounts to be paid by the Tenant hereunder as and when due. During
any period that the Tenant is in default hereunder, ihe Landlord shall have the right, pursuant
to legal proceedings or pursuant to any notice provided for by law, to enter and take possession
of the Premises, without terminating this Sublease, for the purpose of reletting said Premises or
any part thereof and making any alterations and repairs that may be necessary or desirable in
connection with such reletting. Any such reletting or relettings may be for such term or terms
(including periods that would exceed the remaining term hereof), and at such rent or rents, and
upon such other terms and condition as the Landlord may in its sole discretion deem advisable.
Upon each and any such reletting,'the rent or rents received by the Landlord from such reletting
shall be applied as follows: First to the payment of any indebtedness (other than rent) due
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'hereunder from the Tenant to the Landlord; second, to the payment of costs and expenses of
recovering possession of the Premises and such reletting, including brokerage fees, reasonable
attorneys' fees, court costs, and costs of any alterations or repairs; third, to the payment of rent,
additional rent, and other amounts due and unpaid hereunder; and fourth, the residue, if any,
shall be held by the Landlord and applied in payment of future rent, additional rent, and other
amounts as the same become due and payable hereunder. If the rent or rents received during
any month and applied as provided above shall be insufficient to cover all such amounts
including the rent, additional rent, and other amounts to be paid hereunder by the Tenant for
such month, the Tenant shall pay to the Landlord any such deficiency; such deficiencies shall
be calculated and paid monthly. No entry or taking possession of the Premises by the Landlord
shall be construed as an election by the Landlord to terminate this Sublease, unless the Landlord
gives written notice of such election to the Tenant or unless such termination shall be decreed
by a court of competent jurisdiction. Notwithstanding any reletting by the Landlord without
termination, the Landlord may at any time thereafter terminate this Sublease for such previous
default by giving written notice thereof to the Tenant.
(b)

The Landlord shall have the right at its option to terminate this Sublease

and the Tenant's right to possession hereunder by giving notice thereof to the Tenant, in which
case this Sublease shall terminate and the Tenant shall immediately surrender possession of the
Premises to the Landlord. In such event the Landlord shall be entitled to recover from the
Tenant all damages incurred by .the Landlord by reason of the Tenant's default, including
without limitation the following: (i) All unpaid rent which had been earned at the time of such
termination (together with interest thereon at the rate of one and on-half percent (1.5%) per
month to the time of award); plus (ii) the amount by which the unpaid rent which would have
been earned after termination until the time of the award (together with interest thereon at the
rate of one and one-half percent (1.5%) per month to the'time of award) exceeds the amount of
such rental loss that is proved could have been reasonably avoided; plus (iii) the worth at the
time of award of the amount by which the unpaid rent for the balance of the term after the time
of award exceeds the amount of such rental loss that is proved could be reasonably avoided; plus
(iv) any other amount necessary to compensate the Landlord for all detriment proximately caused
by the Tenant's' failure to perform its obligations under this Sublease or which in the ordinary
course of things would be likely, to result therefrom; plus (v) the amount of all costs and
expenses, including court costs and reasonable attorneys' fees, incurred by the Landlord in
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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recovering possession of the Premises and damages incurred by the Landlord; plus (vi) at the
Landlord's election, such other amounts in addition to or in lieu of the foregoing as may be
permitted from time to time by applicable law. The "wonh at the time of award" shall be
computed by discounting the involved amount at the discount rate of the U.S. Federal Reserve
Bank at the time of award plus one percent (1%).
19.03. Waiver of Redemption Rights. The Tenant hereby expressly waives any and all
rights of redemption granted by or under present or future laws in the event of the Tenant being
evicted or dispossessed for any cause, or in the event of the Landlord's obtaining possession of
the Premises by reason of the Tenant's violation of any of the terms, covenants, or conditions
of this Sublease or otherwise.
19.04. Additional Remedies. In addition to the nonexclusive remedies provided in this
Section 19, the Landlord shall have all remedies now or hereafter provided by law for enforcing,
the provisions of this Sublease and the Landlord's rights hereunder.. In the event of any default
hereunder by the Tenant, the Landlord shall be entitled to recover from the Tenant all costs and
expenses (including reasonable attorneys' fees and court costs) incurred by the Landlord, with
or without suit, in obtaining possession of the Premises, in collecting any rent, additional rent,
or other amount due hereunder, .or in enforcing or interpreting the'provisions of this Sublease
or any right of the Landlord hereunder.
•20.

ATTORNMENT AND SUBORDINATION.
20.01. Estoppel Certificates. The Tenant shall from time to time, within ten (10) days

after written request therefor from the Landlord, execute, acknowledge, and deliver to the
Landlord a statement in writing (i) certifying that this Sublease is unmodified and in full force
and effect (or, if modified, stating the nature of such modification and certifying that this
Sublease as so modified is in* full force and effect), and (ii)certifying the date to which rent and
other charges are paid in advance, if any, (Hi) acknowledging that there are no uncured defaults
under this Sublease on the pan of the Landlord (or specifying such defaults if any are claimed),
and (iv) verifying such other information ?^ the Landlord may reasonably request. Any such
statement may be conclusively relied upon by any prospective purchaser or encumbrancer of the
Premises or the Ticaboo Shopping Center.
20.02. Transfer of Landlord's Interest. In the event of a sale or conveyance by the
Landlord of Landlord's interest in the Premises other than a transfer for security purposes only.
the Landlord shall notify the Tenant thereof and shall be relieved (from and after the date
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PUNITIVE DAMAGES AWARDS

mission;
*uantto
*10225.
314 (aa);

78-18-1

78-17-4. Determination of causation — Compensation allowed.
(1) Causation of radiological injury from a nuclear incident shall be determined by the trier of fact, taking into account epidemiological studies,
statistical probabilities, and other pertinent medical and scientific evidence.
(2) A claimant under this chapter shall be entitled to full compensation of
the claimant's radiological injuries if the trier of fact determines that it is more
likely than not that such injuries resulted from the nuclear incident.
History: C. 1953, 78-17-4, enacted by L.
1986, ch. 143, } 5.

CHAPTER 18
PUNITIVE DAMAGES AWARDS
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Section
Basis for punitive damages 78-18-2.
awards — Section inapplicable
to DUI cases — Division of
award with state.

Drug exception.

78-18-1. Basis for punitive damages awards — Section
inapplicable to DUI cases — Division of award
with state.
(1) (a) Except as otherwise provided by statute, punitive damages may be
awarded only if compensatory or general damages are awarded and it is
established by clear and convincing evidence that the acts or omissions of
the tortfeasor are the result of willful and malicious or intentionally
fraudulent conduct, or conduct that manifests a knowing and reckless
indifference toward, and a disregard of, the rights of others.
(b) The limitations, standards of evidence, and standards of conduct of
Subsection (l)(a) do not apply to any claim for punitive damages arising
out of the tortfeasor's operation of a motor vehicle while voluntarily
intoxicated or under the influence of any drug or combination of alcohol
and drugs as prohibited by Section 41-6-44.
(c) The award of a penalty under Section 78-11-15 or 78-11-16 regarding
shoplifting is not subject to the prior award of compensatory or general"
damages under Subsection (l)(a) whether or not restitution has been paid
to the merchant prior to or as a part of a civil action under Section 78-11-15
or 78-11-16.
(2) Evidence of a party's wealth or financial condition shall be admissible
only after afindingof liability for punitive damages has been made.
(3) In any judgment where punitive damages are awarded and paid, 50% of
the amount of the punitive damages in excess of $20,000 shall, after payment
of attorneys' fees and costs, be remitted to the state treasurer for deposit into
the General Fund.
History: C. 1953, 78-18-1, enacted by L.
1989, ch. 237, { 1; 1991, ch. 6, § 4.

Applicability. - Laws 1969, ch. 237, § 4
provides that the act applies to all claims for

357
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78-27-56.5

JUDICIAL CODE

(Utah 1987); Hatanaka v. Struhs, 738 P.2d 1052
(Utah Ct. App. 1987); O'Brien v. Rush, 744 R2d
306 (Utah Ct. App. 1987); DeBry v. Occidental/Nebraska Fed. Sav. Bank, 754 P.2d 60 (Utah
1988); Taylor v. Estate of Taylor, 770 P.2d 163

(Utah Ct. App. 1969); Cascade Energy & Metals
Corp. v. Banks, 896 F.2d 1557 (10th Cir. 1990):
Burns Chiropractic Clinic •*. A Estate Tns.'Oo.,
851 P.2d 1209 (Utah Ct. App. 1993).
• •'

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Utah Law Review. — Attorneys Fees in
Utah. 19S4 Utah L. Rev. 553.
Attorney's Fees in Bad Faith, Meritless Actions, 1964 Utah L. Rev. 593.
Recent Developments in Utah Law — Legislative Enactments — Attorney's Fees, 19S9
Utah L. Rev. 342.
Note, "The Negligent Infliction of Emotional
Distress: A New Cause of Action in Utah," 1989
Utah L. Rev. 571.
A.L.R. — Construction and application of
state statute or rule subjecting party making
untrue allegations or denials to payment of

costs or attorneys' fees, 6S A.L.R.3d 209.
Attorneys'fees as recoverable in fraud action,
44 A.L.R.4th 776.
Attorneys* fees: obduracy as basis for statecourt award, 49 A.L.R.4th 825.
Attorney's liability under state law for opposing parry's counsel fees, 56 A.L.R.4th 486.
Recover}* of attorneys'fees and costs of litigation incurred as result of breach of agreement
not to sue, 9 A.L.R.oth 933.
Award of counsel fees to prevailing party
based on adversary's bad faith, obduracy, or
other misconduct, 31 A.L.R. Fed. 633.

78-27-56.5. Attorney's fees — Reciprocal rights to recover
attorney's fees.
A court may award costs and attorney's fees to either party that prevails in
a civil action based upon any promissory note, written contract, or other
writing executed after April 28, 1986, when the provisions of the promissory
note, written contract, or other writing allow at least one party to recover
attorney's fees.
History: C. 1953, 76-27-56.5, enacted bv L.
1986, ch. 79, § 1.
NOTES TO DECISIONS

Discretion of court.
Cited.
Discretion of court.
In an action involving claims for breach of
warranty, misrepresentation, and mutual mistake, where the only claim stemmed from the

contract, it was not an abuse of discretion for
the trial court to determine not to attempt to
allocate the attorneys fees and denial of attorney fees was aopropriate. Schafir v. Harrigan,
879 P.2d 1384 'Utah Ct. App. 1994).
Cited in Carr v. Enoch Smith Co., 781 P.2d
1292 (Utah Ct. App. 1989); Saunders v. Sharp.
840 P.2d 796 fUtah Ct. App. 1992J.

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
A.L.R. - Attorney's liability under state law
for opposing party's counsel fees, 56 A.L.R.4th
486.

Excessiveness or adequacy of attorneys' fees
in matters involving real estate, 10 A.L.R.5th
448.
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